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Purpose of the Report
The Report aims to identify ways in which the current compulsion to take annuities by
age 75 might be amended. It examines the current provision of retirement income for
members of defined contribution pension (DC) plans who are obliged to purchase such
annuities, regardless of personal circumstances. It also looks at the shortcomings of
existing annuities.
Main Proposals
The Report presents four main proposals:
1. An individual would continue to be free to take a tax-free lump sum from their
pension fund subject to the current limits.
2. When someone retires, they must purchase an index-linked annuity to meet a
Minimum Retirement Income (MRI)
3. There should be much greater freedom over the application of any Residual Fund
after the Minimum Retirement Income is achieved
4. The current shortcomings of existing annuities should be reduced by government
and the financial services industry
Whilst some questions still remain we, the members of the Working Party, believe that
the report considerably develops the debate around retirement income.
1  Minimum Retirement Income
The concept of MRI is based on the following simple principle:
On retirement, an individual’s only obligation (assuming sufficient funds exist) should be
ensure an income that, taking into account life expectancy and inflation, will keep the
individual above state support for the rest of their life.
There should only be an obligation to purchase an annuity from a DC pension plan if
individuals are not able to fund the MRI from other sources. In 1999/2000 the MRI would
be set at around £140.00 per week (equivalent to a Basic State Pension and a SERPS
pension for an individual on National Average Earnings).
2  Residual Fund
Having met the MRI individuals would be free to use any Residual Fund in their pension
plan. The Report proposes that individuals may as now draw up to 25% of the original
pension fund (pre-MRI) tax free. Remaining assets would be then allowed to grow on a
tax deferred basis, until withdrawn when they would be subject to the individual’s highest
marginal rate of income tax.
2
3  Existing Shortcomings of the Annuity Market
Once MRI is accepted then more innovative ways of providing for further income in
retirement from pension plans can be found – not simply based upon annuities.
4  Conclusions
There are no simple answers to the present problems associated with providing income in
retirement. Individuals are different and have differing requirements. This Report offers
ideas and solutions to provide individuals with both choice and flexibility whilst ensuring
they do not fall back on State benefits. Our aim is to open the public debate on these
issues.
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Improving Security and Flexibility in Retirement
1.  Introduction
This Report arises from an earlier study by McDonald (1999) which was one of the first
studies to question the value for money from purchasing annuities in a regime of low
nominal interest rates.  The present Report investigates the current system in the United
Kingdom of retirement income provision of those members of pension plans who are
obliged to purchase life annuities by the age of 75 at the latest. It assesses the obligation
to purchase annuities regardless of personal circumstances and discusses some of the
shortcomings of both existing annuity products and the regulations relating to these
products.
The Report makes a number of recommendations.  In particular, the Report: (1) proposes
that, individuals should be allowed to keep the 25% tax-free lump sum when they retire
(2) proposes that, on the individual’s chosen retirement date, life annuities should be
purchased only to a level necessary to meet, taking into account all other sources of life-
long income (including the Basic State Pension), a Minimum Retirement Income that is
increased over time in line with increases in the Retail Price Index for the remaining life
of the annuitant, (3)  proposes that there should be much greater freedom in the
application of any Residual Fund (above that needed to meet this MRI), and (4) proposes
that the design of annuities and other retirement products should be improved by
identifying ways in which the shortcomings of existing products and their associated
regulations can be reduced or eliminated by appropriate measures taken by both
government and the financial services industry.
2.  Annuities and Other Sources of Retirement Income Provision
The first step in the analysis is to specify the objectives of a pension plan and to examine
how annuities and other forms of retirement income provision meet these objectives.
2.1 Purpose of a pension plan
The primary objectives of a pension plan are to:
Provide adequate retirement income security for the remaining
life of the pensioner and his or her dependants,
and
Eliminate the risk that the pensioner outlives his or her
resources.
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This implies that the primary purpose of a pension plan is to fund for income rather than
capital, since only an income stream satisfying certain conditions (in particular that it is
life long and protected from inflation) can guarantee to meet these objectives. In some
ways, this concept only partly meets the needs of those approaching retirement, given the
availability of different assets outside formal pension plans, the changing patterns of
work, longevity, lifestyle and the switch to personal responsibility implicit in the growth
in defined contribution pension plans.
2.2 Annuities
A life annuity is a financial contract that provides regular income to the annuity purchaser
for his or her remaining life. The different types of annuities commonly sold are
explained in Appendix A to this Report.
Currently, for the vast majority of those members of defined contribution (DC) pension
plans1 reaching retirement, the purchase of a life annuity is ultimately the only option
open to them2. This same obligation will apply to those who save for their retirement
through the forthcoming stakeholder pension schemes. It is also imposed on those who
make additional savings through additional voluntary contributions (AVCs) and free-
standing additional voluntary contributions (FSAVCs).
At the same time, we should note that State pay-as-you-go (PAYG) plans3 and
occupational defined benefit (DB) plans4 (such as final salary plans) also involve implicit
life annuities. With individually arranged pension plans (such as personal pension plans),
the annuity must be purchased from an authorised life office;  with occupational DC
plans, the annuity can be provided directly by the plan itself.
Annuities are not a common financial product in many parts of the world, including most
of continental Europe. Appendix B examines some key countries in which annuities are
sold.  The main finding is that there is generally no compulsion to purchase annuities with
the proceeds from the pension fund.  Some countries, such as the US and Australia, allow
individuals considerable freedom of access to the proceeds of their fund once they retire.
Another group of countries, including Chile, Singapore and (after recent reforms) Ireland,
allow freedom of access to the proceeds once a minimum income or a minimum fund has
been secured.  The purchase of an annuity is often just one of a number of alternative
arrangements for generating retirement income security.
2.3  Alternatives to annuities
There are currently few real alternatives to the purchase of an annuity during the
retirement phase of DC pension plans.  The two main ones are taking the accumulated
pension fund in cash and income drawdown.
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2.3.1 Taking the pension fund in cash
One possibility is for the accumulated fund to go to the pensioner as a cash sum on the
retirement date, with the pensioner free to spend this or reinvest this as he or she wishes.
In the UK, it is possible under current personal pension rules to take up to 25% of the
accumulated fund as a tax-free lump sum.
2.3.2 Income drawdown
With income drawdown, the capital sum remains invested in a fund and individuals are
permitted to draw an income from the fund until they reach the age of 75 at which time
they must purchase an annuity.  Income drawdown is unique to the UK.
Income drawdown was first introduced in the UK by the 1995 Finance Act, following an
unprecedented fall in government bond yields and hence annuity rates during the 1990s.
Gilt yields fell from a peak of 15.8% in 1981 to 4.4% in 1998, the lowest rate since the
1950s, before rising slightly to 4.9% in 1999. Following the 1995 Finance Act,
individuals can delay purchasing an annuity until age 75, during which time they can
draw an income from the fund that is between 35% and 100% of that available from a
single-life level annuity.  Tables for doing this are supplied by the Government Actuary,
and the arrangements have to be reviewed triennially. If the individual dies before the
annuity is purchased, the following choices are available: the individual’s spouse can
continue using the drawdown facility until age 75 and if he or she, in turn, dies before this
age, the balance of the fund forms part of his or her estate; or the spouse can purchase a
standard annuity; or the balance of the fund can be received as a lump sum, currently
subject to a 35% capital charge.
Table 2.1 shows the size of the income drawdown market in the UK in comparison with
the pension annuity market. By 1999, income drawdown accounted for 24% of the
retirement income market: 16,000 income drawdown plans were sold at a cost of
£1.893bn, while 239,000 pension annuity policies were sold at a cost of £5.945bn. Table
2.2 shows that pension annuity payments totalled £7.514bn in 1999, the bulk of which
came from personal and occupational defined contribution pension plans. Table 2.3
shows that the vast majority of the compulsory purchase pension annuities sold in 1999
were non-profit annuities which include level annuities, index-linked annuities and
escalating annuities. With-profit annuities accounted for 7% of the market in 1999, but is
the fastest growing segment of the market and it is expected that 20% of all annuities sold
by 2001 will be with-profit.  Unit-linked annuities have a tiny share of the UK market
unlike the US.
In 1999, the average size of the fund used to buy a compulsory purchase annuity was
£30,000, while the average size of the fund used for income drawdown was £120,000.
Table 2.4 shows the structure of retirement income products sold in 1999 to male and
female customers of a typical life office.  Male retirement income is substantially higher
than female retirement income particularly in drawdown, although the average purchase
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ages are just a year apart. Only a small proportion of customers take any form of
escalation. Men are more likely than women to purchase joint-survivor annuities.
Table 2.1  Gross new premiums (£bn) for pension annuities and income drawdown
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Pension annuities 2.685 2.623 3.118 3.394 3.944 5.755 5.945
Income drawdown - - - 1.125 1.573 1.808 1.893
Total 2.685 2.623 3.118 4.519 5.517 7.563 7.838
Source: Association of British Insurers
Table 2.2  Annuities in force in course of payment (£bn)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Purchased life 0.979 1.001 0.942 0.829 0.806 0.801 0.780
Deferred pension 0.284 0.276 0.450 0.396 0.428 0.300 0.328
Personal pension 0.846 0.870 1.043 1.281 1.707 2.436 3.289
Occupational 1.878 2.104 2.309 2.599 2.747 2.915 3.117
Total 3.987 4.251 4.744 5.105 5.688 6.452 7.514
Source: Association of British Insurers
Table 2.3  Composition of compulsory purchase pension annuities market in 1999
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Total 100
Source:  Estimates from Standard Life
Table 2.4   Retirement income products in 1999 by sex
Males Females
Average payment per annum Pension annuity £2,687.11 £1,813.54
Income drawdown £9,199.63 £4,288.01
Average purchase age Pension annuity 63.0 years 61.6 years
Income drawdown 63.1 years 62.1 years
Purchaser sex Pension annuity 52% 48%
Income drawdown 70% 30%
Proportion with escalation Pension annuity 16% 17%
Income drawdown 6% 15%
Proportion of annuities with 45% 23%
spouse’s benefits
Source: Typical life office
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Finally, Table 2.5 lists some key annuity rates for January 2000. As a result of
inflationary expectations being well below 5%, RPI and LPI annuities offer the same
initial income which is (depending on sex) 22-25% lower than the corresponding income
on a level annuity. Unisex annuity rates give women nearly 10% more than standard
rates, although the  reduction for males is much less than this.
Table 2.5  Annuity rates for January 2000
Standard (£) Unisex (£)
Male aged 65 Level 4,291
Retail price indexed 3,341 3,296
Limited price indexed 3,341 3,296
Female aged 65 Level 3,978
Retail price indexed 3,001 3,296
Limited price indexed 3,001 3,296
Note:  Purchase price of £50,000, guaranteed 5 years, monthly in advance
Source:  Prudential Annuities
3 The Economic Arguments Favouring Annuities
Despite these alternatives to annuities, there are some compelling economic arguments
that support the purchase of an annuity when someone retires.
The consumption expenditures of individuals are typically much less volatile than their
income tends to be.  This suggests that individuals attempt to smooth out their
consumption over time.  This conjecture has been formalised in the Life Cycle
Hypothesis5 which predicts that individuals will attempt to smooth out their consumption
over their full lifetime. To do this they will need to build up assets during their working
life by consuming less than their income whilst they are in work. These asset holdings are
then gradually liquidated during their retirement to finance a standard of living that could
not otherwise be supported from the resources typically available during retirement6. One
formal way of accumulating these assets is through a pension plan. An informal way is
through property: individuals might own a large home when they are in work, but move
to a smaller home when they retire and live off the housing equity thereby released.
One key problem with the informal ways of running down assets during retirement is the
uncertainty attached to the length of an individual’s life: no one knows for sure how long
they will live. Formal mechanisms for accumulating and then running down assets, such
as pension plans, deal with this problem by using life annuities: payment streams that
continue until the death of the plan member. Annuities are currently a key part of defined
contribution pension plans, but have problems in incentivising new savers when annuity
rates are low. Informal mechanisms for running down assets during retirement will,
unless individuals are particularly prescient about the timing of their death, lead to
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individuals running out of assets before they die or alternatively leave unspent assets that
will form part of their estate.
Annuities are the only financial instrument capable of dealing with longevity risk, the
uncertainty attached to the length of an individual’s life. Several studies7 have shown that,
under conditions of perfect capital markets8 and no bequest motive by individuals, it is
optimal for individuals to annuitise all their wealth in retirement.
Yet very few individuals voluntarily choose to annuitise their discretionary wealth9. A
number of explanations have been put forward for this. First, when individuals have a
strong bequest motive, they will not want to annuitise all their wealth10. Second, when
there is inflation uncertainty and capital markets are imperfect (so that indexed-linked
annuities are not available, for example), then it is irrational for individuals to annuitise
all their wealth, even if they have no bequest motive11.  Third, annuities might be poor
value for money given the risks that they hedge12. In other words, the implied rate of
return on life annuities as a result of life office loads might be much lower than on
alternative investments, taking into account the life-long income guarantee that they offer.
Nevertheless, insurance loads would have to be substantial before it became optimal not
to annuitise and to accept the longevity risk13.
In occupational defined benefit and State pay-as-you-go pension plans, individuals are
usually not given the choice as to whether they annuitise their accumulated pension
assets14 or not (with the exception of certain commutation rights whereby retirees can
commute part of their pension in the form of a cash lump sum). The same used to be the
case with defined contribution plans in the UK, but since 1995, members of personal
pension plans have been able to delay the purchase of an annuity until age 75.
It is arguable that, if high insurance loads are sufficiently high, it may be optimal to defer
full annuitisation and invest the accumulated assets in higher yielding (if also riskier)
investments until it is no longer possible to beat the mortality-adjusted rate of return from
a life annuity, so long as a minimum consumption stream can be secured in the
meantime15.
4.  Should Pensioners be Obliged to Purchase Annuities or Should Some Other
Choice be Available?
Despite these powerful economic arguments favouring the purchase of annuities, there are
a range of problems with annuities. However, there are also problems with the
alternatives to annuities. We discuss these in turn.
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4.1  Problems with annuities
4.1.1 Public perception of annuities
For some, perhaps increasing, numbers of people, the purchase of an annuity on
retirement no longer appears to be an attractive option. Why is it that people are
increasingly unwilling to buy an annuity when they retire? A number of factors must be
considered.
First, annuity rates are currently very low by historical standards. Rates can reasonably be
expected to be higher at some date in the future (although so can inflation). Second, lives
are changing - and continue to change in retirement.  Perhaps some part-time work is
undertaken, family circumstances change or greater help is needed in later years either in
one's own home or elsewhere. Third, as people continue to retire early, often in their 50s,
a retirement period of probably 30 years stretches in front of them. It therefore seems
premature to purchase a product which, once bought, cannot be changed. Further, the
longer the anticipated retirement period, the lower the annuity will be for a given lump
sum. At times of low nominal interest rates, the lump sum accumulated does not generate
a very high annuity.  Finally, despite the wish by pensioners for retirement income
security, most individuals appear to be reluctant to convert capital into income if the
balance of capital is lost when the individual dies.  This is precisely what happens when
someone purchases a single life annuity16.
For all these reasons, greater flexibility is required to balance against the security which
an annuity offers.
4.1.2 Highly concentrated provision
Even in economies with well-developed annuity markets, the market for immediate
annuities is highly concentrated. For example, of around 240 authorised life offices in the
UK, virtually the entire annuity market is supplied by just 20 firms, with the top five life
offices accounting for more than 50% of the market17.  Life offices themselves regard the
annuities market as highly competitive.
4.1.3  Adverse selection and longevity risk
For those who are able to purchase annuities on a voluntary basis there is an element of
self selection, since those who believe they are most likely to live longer than the average
for the population of the same age will tend to purchase the annuity.  However, most
annuities sold in the UK relate to pension plans and, on the basis of current pensions
legislation, the provision of an annuity becomes compulsory (at age 75), so it could be
argued that currently most annuities in the UK are not bought on a voluntary basis.
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Insurance companies base the mortality assumption used in pricing annuities on the past
experience of those taking out each type of annuity contract.  So for pension annuity
business, this will reflect the general experience of those who have pension funds
requiring them to take an annuity.  Within that group there may be a sub-group who retire
through ill health and so have much heavier prospective mortality than the group as a
whole.  Currently there is only a limited ability for such people to get better terms.
However, it should be recognised that if the market as a whole were to offer them better
terms then the counter balance to this is that others would get worse terms.
4.1.4 Underestimating increases in longevity
Possibly the biggest single risk that insurance companies face in writing annuity business
is that they will underestimate the future improvement in longevity (see Table 4.1).  The
assumptions made in pricing annuities do make allowance for a best estimate of what
future rates of improvement in longevity might be.  However, the past few years have
shown this to be a very difficult exercise to get right and most life offices would believe
that the last few years have seen longevity improvements at a faster rate than they had
anticipated within their pricing of annuities. In fact, longevity forecast errors of up to 20%
over intervals as short as 10 years are not uncommon and some insurance companies in
the UK have underestimated the average life expectancy of their pool of annuitants by up
to two years18. Insurance companies add margins to cover these risks19 (see Appendix C).
Table 4.1 Improvements in Average Life Expectancy over Time.
1980 - 1982    Male aged 60      16.38
   Male aged 65      13.04
   Female aged 60      20.89
   Female aged 65      16.98
1990 - 1992    Male aged 60      17.85
   Male aged 65      14.27
   Female aged 60      22.08
   Female aged65      18.11
1998    Male aged 60      20.6
   Male aged 65      16.4
   Female aged 60      24.8
   Female aged 65      20.0
Source: English Life Tables/Government Actuary
4.1.5 Inflation risk
The risk faced by those purchasing level annuities, that unanticipated high inflation
rapidly reduces the real value of the pension.
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4.1.6 Interest rate risk
Annuity rates vary substantially over the interest rate cycle. They are related to the yields
on government bonds of the same expected term; and since these yields vary by up to
150% over the cycle, annuity rates will vary by the same order of magnitude20.
4.1.7 Reinvestment (or mismatch) risk
The risk faced by annuity providers that there are insufficient suitable long-maturing
matching assets available to make the annuity payments, with the consequence that the
proceeds from maturing assets may have to be reinvested on less favourable terms or in
less suitable assets.
4.1.8 Inflexible annuity regulations
The development of more flexible products, more able to cope with the wide variations in
annuitants’ needs outlined above, is still hampered by legislation, specifically the Income
and Corporation Taxes Act 1988. Designs which might be useful but are not currently
permissible include the following.
Example 1
A 65-year old woman lives with her twin sister.  She seeks an income in retirement which
will continue to be paid to her sister after her death.  Again, the annuity must increase in
line with prices.  Currently, legislation does not allow the purchase of joint life annuities
for unmarried individuals who are not financially dependent on each other.
Example 2
A 65-year old man is concerned that an annuity might not be best value for money for
him.  He is worried that if he dies in the near future, he will not have had good value from
the annuity.  He could purchase an annuity which, on death, returns the excess of the
purchase price over the payments he has already received. Again, the annuity must
increase in line with prices.  The purchase of such ‘capital protected’ annuities from
pension funds is not permitted by current legislation.
Example 3
A 70-year old man retired at 65 with a level annuity, but has become concerned about
inflation and would like to switch to an indexed annuity.  Current legislation does not
currently permit such a switch.
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4.2 Problems with alternatives to annuities
4.2.1 Taking the pension fund in cash
If the accumulated fund is taken in cash, the pensioner now bears his or her own
longevity risk and there is also the moral hazard risk of spending the cash too quickly and
then going back to the State for help in the form of means-tested benefits: this is known
as ‘double dipping’ in Australia.
Once in payment, annuities are taxed at the pensioner’s highest marginal tax rate. This is
in line with the key purpose of the pension plan which is to fund for income rather than
capital. However, it is not clear that the tax breaks granted during the accumulation stage
are justified if  the primary purpose of the plan is to fund for capital, unless the capital
sum is taxed at a rate that makes pension funding broadly tax neutral over the lifetime of
the plan member.
4.2.2 Income drawdown
A number of important questions arise with income drawdown. First, annuity rates might
actually be lower by the time the individual reaches 75.  Second, the charges with income
drawdown are much higher than for annuities due to the costs of advice, ongoing
monitoring of the plan and the triennial review.  Third, investment performance during
the deferral period might be poor with the result that the fund  falls in value. Fourth, by
not buying an annuity, individuals forego a ‘mortality cross-subsidy’ (a cross-subsidy
allowed for in annuity rates which arises because some annuitants will die shortly after
taking out an annuity thereby releasing a ‘mortality profit’ which insurance companies
share with longer-surviving annuitants): the mortality cross-subsidy is cumulative over
time, and by delaying the purchase of an annuity, individuals experience a so-called
‘mortality drag’ (see Appendix D).
In short, income drawdown is a more expensive and potentially riskier product than an
annuity and may therefore not be suitable for many pensioners, particularly those with
low overall net worth or who have a low tolerance for risk21.
4.3  How are annuities currently managed?
Insurance companies invest the premiums that are used to buy annuities in a variety of
investments of a fixed-income type which generate cash flows that match as near is
possible the required cash flows on the annuity.  It is important that both the term of the
investment and the degree or risk attached to default on the investment are taken into
account in the pricing of annuities.  The term of the investment is inversely related to the
age of annuitant because the younger the annuitant the longer they are likely to live.
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Insurance companies invest in a range of investments which would include not only
standard fixed-income, government and corporate bonds, but also commercial mortgages,
private finance initiatives and privately placed bond issues. Similarly, if the yields on
equivalent bonds are higher in foreign markets, some insurance companies will buy bonds
in these foreign markets and then use currency swaps to convert the coupon payments
into the home currency.  In choosing some of the latter  investments, life companies are
trying to improve on the yield they would get from government bonds even after allowing
for the additional risk assumed.  This is why the most competitive annuity rates quoted
are significantly higher than implied by the yields on equivalent-term government bonds.
In selling an RPI-linked annuity, the life company would look to match this against an
RPI-linked bond of some type although sometimes alternative derivative based solutions
may be available. Few insurance companies would take on the risk of selling indexed
annuities with expected maturities beyond that of the most distant trading index-linked
government bond.
Annuitants themselves remain exposed to interest and inflation risk. If a DC scheme
member retires during an interest rate trough (as happened in the mid-1990s in the UK,
for example), he or she can end up with what might be perceived to be a very low
pension. Similarly, if a 65-year old male annuitant chooses an indexed annuity, he will
receive an initial cash sum that is about 30% lower than that from a level annuity, and,
with inflation at 3% p.a., it  would take 11 years for the indexed annuity to exceed the
level annuity and 19 years before the total cash payments are equalised.  Since retired
people also tend to underestimate how long they will continue to live, most prefer to buy
a level annuity and thereby retain the inflation risk.
There is much confusion over the question of inflation.  We often hear people say that the
value for money of annuities has fallen just because annuity yields have fallen to their
lowest level in 30 years. But this could be a sign of ‘money illusion’ which involves a
confusion between the nominal value of a product and its real value as a consequence of a
rapid change in the general level of prices (this is explained in more detail in Appendix
E).
Also if the pricing of both level and indexed annuities are actuarially fair and if the
longevity and inflation assumptions built into these  prices are realised in full, then the
two types of annuities have equivalent values and only the timing of the real value of the
payments differs22.  With  level annuities, the real value is concentrated at the start of the
policy, whereas with an indexed annuity the real value is spread evenly over the life of the
policy. Some annuitants may prefer to have the real value of their retirement income
concentrated at the beginning of their retirement period, while others may not.  Only if
there is unanticipated inflation or an unanticipated increase in life expectancy will it be
the case that the indexed annuity turns out to provide better value for money than the
level annuity. But we should be clear how this happens: unanticipated inflation involves
an unplanned transfer from the government (as issuer of the indexed bond backing the
indexed annuity) to the annuitant, while an unanticipated increase in life expectancy
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involves an unplanned transfer from the annuity provider’s reserves to the long-living
annuitant.  The greater these two risks, the greater the inflation and longevity risk premia
that have to be built into the pricing of indexed annuities. These risk premia compensate
for the difficulties of forecasting inflation and longevity in the distant future. But
nevertheless, in an efficient annuities market, having adjusted for these risks, the two
types of annuities will have equivalent values: as always there are no free lunches around!
(see again Appendix D).
The outcome is that insurance companies use the financial markets to hedge the interest
and inflation rate risks that they face from the date that the annuity is purchased.
Interest rate risk up until the date of retirement is borne by the future annuitant, and
inflation risk after the retirement date is also borne by the annuitant unless he or she is
willing to forego a substantial cash sum at the start of retirement as a consequence of
purchasing an indexed annuity.
Longevity risk is covered by the price that new annuitants pay.  However, the risk
associated with underestimating increases in longevity falls entirely on the insurance
company providing the annuity: in consequence there are times when insurance
companies lose money on their annuity business.
5. Proposal: Members of Defined Contribution Pension Plans should be Required to
Purchase an Annuity only up to a Level Necessary to Meet a Minimum Retirement
Income at the Age of Retirement
In view of the two key conflicting issues with annuities outlined above, namely that they
hedge longevity risk, but individuals are reluctant to give away capital, the Report
considers ways in which flexibility can be improved without sacrificing security.
5.1 Definition of the Minimum Retirement Income
Recognising that the State has offered generous tax breaks to encourage individuals to
build up assets for their retirement, the Report acknowledges that the State has two main
concerns in respect of  the distribution phase of the pension plan, namely that
distributions are not made in a way that will lead to plan members falling back on the
State for their retirement income at any stage during their retirement, and that the plan is
broadly tax neutral over the member’s life cycle, so that tax reliefs granted during the
accumulation stage are recovered during the distribution stage.
The Report therefore proposes, as a minimum requirement, that for every individual with
one or more defined contribution pension plans, the total funds from all these plans have
to be used to purchase annuities only up to a level needed to provide (taking into account
any Basic State Pension, any SERPS pension and any other private pension(s)) a
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Minimum Retirement Income which is uprated annually in line with increases in the
Retail Price Index for the remaining life of the individual.
This proposal is based on the following principle:
Recognising the Inland Revenue requirement that the purpose
of a pension fund is to provide retirement income, an
individual’s only obligation on retirement (assuming sufficient
assets in the pension fund) should be to take steps to guarantee
an annual income that, taking into account life expectancy and
inflation, will keep the individual above State support for the
remainder of his or her life.
Any other sources of income that satisfy the condition that they are subject to RPI
uprating or better for the remaining life of the individual can count towards the MRI.
Other sources of lifelong income that are not subject to RPI uprating can also count
towards the MRI after an appropriate adjustment has been made. The difference between
the MRI and the sum of all these other sources of income is denoted the Residual  Income
Requirement (RIR): this is the amount that needs to be annuitised from the DC pension
fund.
The MRI becomes payable once an individual first decides that he or she wishes to draw
a retirement income other than a State pension (irrespective of whether they have actually
stopped working or reached State Pension Age) or by a stipulated maximum age. The age
at which this occurs is denoted the MRI Start Age.  The Report recognises that phased
retirement is an increasing option and also that individuals may have a number of
policies23. As individuals progressively withdraw from full-time work, they would be
required to purchase RPI annuities up to the level of the MRI. There also has to be a
maximum age for drawing the MRI to prevent the pension plan being used to evade
taxation. The maximum age should be 75, the same as the current maximum age for
drawing a pension annuity and should move in line with any changes in the latter.
If the Start Age is on or after State Pension Age, then the actual State pension benefits
would be taken into account in the calculation of the RIR. If the Start Age is before State
Pension Age, then a step-down annuity must be purchased. This is an annuity that will
pay the MRI until State Pension Age, at which point it will fall to pay the RIR as State
pension benefits begin to be drawn24. A two-step-down annuity can be purchased if  the
normal age for drawing a private pension falls between the Start Age and State Pension
Age.
To meet the MRI, individuals would have to demonstrate to the Inland Revenue or DSS
that the sum of their pension entitlements (both State and private), at the Start Age, will
deliver the MRI for the remainder of their lives. If the assets in the pension fund are
insufficient to meet the RIR, then the full amount of the pension fund must be annuitised
at the Start Age. However, recognising the importance of the current entitlement to a 25%
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tax-free lump sum, the Report accepts that this entitlement should take precedence over
the requirement to meet the RIR, even if this means that the MRI cannot be fully met as a
consequence.
The MRI is intended to provide an income stream that is inflation proof. Therefore
different rules would apply depending on whether the income stream being used to meet
(in whole or part) the MRI was index-linked or not. There would need to be some
mechanism for comparing an index-linked pension (e.g. under a defined benefit plan)
with one which is not, if this was being used to meet the MRI.  Therefore, if a defined
benefit plan was due to pay a pension that was not index-linked, the pension provider
would be required to provide a calculation of an equivalent index-linked income for MRI
purposes. This would be found by multiplying the flat rate pension by the ratio of the first
payment from an indexed annuity to the first payment from a level annuity with the same
purchase price. This would be purely for MRI calculation purposes: the pension provider
would not be required to provide an index-linked pension in respect of this amount.
It might also be possible to use a level annuity for MRI purposes provided a suitable
adjustment is made to cover the inflation risk: in other words, the level annuity would
have to provide an income that exceeded the MRI by a specified margin. This proposal
recognises the possibility that the demand for index-linked annuities to meet the MRI
may outstrip the supply of index-linked bonds available on the market.  This would have
the effect of driving down index-linked annuity yields and make them very poor value for
money.
Having demonstrated that the MRI had been met, the Inland Revenue or DSS would issue
a certificate that the individual would pass to his or her pension provider(s) which would
then allow the pension assets not used to meet the MRI to remain invested in a pension
fund tax environment.  Failure to obtain such a certificate (e.g. because pension
entitlements and assets were not sufficient to meet the MRI) would mean that the
individual would be compelled to use all pension assets (after deduction of the 25% tax-
free lump sum) to purchase an RPI life annuity.
The simplest approach is that every individual should have to meet their own MRI. But
there are a number of implications.  The first arises from the rules governing spouse’s
benefits from both State and private pension schemes.  For example, while most
individuals now earn a BSP based on their own contributions, some married women are
entitled to a BSP on the basis of their husband’s contribution record at 60% of his rate;
on their husband's death, they will obtain a full basic pension. With SERPS, married
women will receive 50% of their husband’s pension if he dies after April 2000. With
occupational schemes, the spouse receives a maximum of two-thirds of the member’s
pension when the member dies.  So the first implication of this recommendation is that
should one of the spouses die, the surviving partner will end up receiving total pension
amounts in excess of the MRI.
A second implication is that if one of the spouses has not built up sufficient assets to
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meet the MRI, there would no requirement for the other spouse to make up the shortfall,
thereby increasing the likelihood of the first spouse falling back on State benefits at some
future stage. It would, of course, be possible for one spouse to elect to purchase a joint-
survivor annuity covering the MRIs of both partners, but, under our proposals, there
would be no obligation to do this.  A third implication arises in the event of divorce:
individuals would be required to meet the MRI after any pension splitting obligations
have been taken into account.
The RPI life annuity would be taxable at the member’s highest marginal rate of income
tax and no benefit would pass on the member’s death, unless a joint-survivor annuity had
been purchased, in which case the benefit would cease on the spouse’s death if this was
after the member.
The Report proposes that, if mortality rates between men and women actually converge,
the government might consider widening the use of unisex annuity rates to include the
annuity needed to meet the RIR. There is some evidence that mortality rates for men and
women are beginning to converge25.
Finally, the Report considered as an alternative to the MRI the proposal introduced in the
Irish Republic by the 1999 Finance Act to maintain a minimum lump sum in a pension
account. The Report sees weaknesses in this proposal, since a lump sum that is capable of
delivering a given life-long indexed income on one particular date may not, as a result of
changes in asset values, annuity yields and mortality assumptions etc, be capable of
delivering the same life-long indexed income at some date in the future.
5.2  Levels for the MRI
The Report considered three different levels for the MRI for an individual plan member:
1.  The same level as the Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG). In 1999/2000, the MIG
was £75 per week and the Basic State Pension was £66.75 per week, implying a RIR of
£8.25 per week that needed to be funded from the pension fund (assuming no other
eligible sources of income).  The government plans for the BSP to rise in line with prices,
while the MIG is planned to rise in line with earnings.
2.  The best that can be achieved from combined membership of the Basic State Pension
Scheme and the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme for a member on National
Average Earnings (NAE), namely 20% of NAE in excess of the Lower Earnings Limit.
This came to approximately £140 per week in 1999/200026.
3.  The average that is achieved from combined membership of the Basic State Pension
scheme and an occupational pension scheme.  This came to about £220 per week in
1999/200027.
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The Report rejects the first option on the grounds that (a) an MRI equal to the MIG
would be too low to guarantee that the individual would always stay off State benefits,
and (b) the excess over the BSP of £8.25 per week would grow very rapidly over time
and in such a complex manner (which depended on both the price and earnings inflation
rates) that no existing financial instrument is able to match it.  The Report also rejects
the third option on the grounds that this sum was higher than the financial contentment
level of £193 per week that results of surveys conducted by National Westminster Life
Assurance (1999) indicated provided a comfortable standard of living in retirement.
The Report therefore recommends the second option on the grounds that this is broadly
the minimum that private sector pension plans must offer in order to contract out of
SERPS. There is, of course, the danger that, if earnings growth is significantly greater
than the rate of retail price inflation, the MIG will eventually exceed this level.
The Aberdeen Asset Management Retirement Income Survey provides evidence that
about a quarter of current pensioners and those near retirement who have some pension
entitlements involving the purchase of annuities are likely to have retirement income
above the MRI if it is set at the level indicated in the second option (Appendix F).
If someone has entitlement to the full Basic State Pension, a Residual Income
Requirement of around £70 per week would be needed to meet the Minimum Retirement
Income in full in 1999/2000.  This would require a fund of £55,100 for a 65-year old man
and a fund of £62,200 for a 65-year old female retiring in January 2000.
5.3 Illustration
John Smith has had a variety of jobs over the years. He has been an employee all his
working life but has not always had access to an occupational pension, although he was
in a defined benefit scheme for a few years.  He has always contracted out of SERPS.  He
is 65 and has decided to retire.
He has the following pension entitlements and assets:
•  a Basic State Pension of £3,471
•  a defined benefit entitlement of £1,000 (not index-linked)
•  a personal pension plan with assets of £150,000
John’s tax-free entitlement is 25% of the assets in the personal pension plan, i.e.,
£150,000. This gives a maximum tax-free lump sum of £150,000 x 25% = £37,500.  He
takes the full amount.
The MRI is set at £7,280 per annum.  John begins by deducting the Basic State Pension








The next stage is to consider any pension entitlements which are life-long but are not
indexed to inflation.  John’s defined benefit scheme will provide a fixed income of
£1,000 a year.  Suppose this is treated as equivalent to an index-linked income of £779.
This is found by taking the ratio of £3341 (the first year’s income from an RPI annuity
for a 65-year old male as shown in Table 2.4 above) to £4291 (the annual income from a
level annuity from the same table) and multiplying this ratio by £1000. John’s MRI
calculation now looks like:








John therefore has to a Residual Income Requirement of  £3,030 which must be met from
the assets in the personal pension plan.  Suppose that the current market price of an RPI
life annuity paying £3030 per annum is £45,866.  John must therefore use £45,866 to
purchase this annuity.
Having deducted the £37,500 tax-free lump sum and the £45,866 annuity purchase price
from the £150,000 pension fund, John is left with £66,634 in the Residual Fund.  Section
7  proposes that there should be much greater freedom than currently exists over how this
sum might be applied.
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6  Projecting the Level of Contributions Required to Provide a Minimum
Retirement Income
We have undertaken some projections of the level of contributions into a DC pension
plan needed to meet the Minimum Retirement Income level for someone who joins the
plan in 2000 aged 25 and retires in 2040 aged 65.  We have done this under two different
sets of assumptions concerning investment returns.  The first is that investment returns
are deterministic (i.e., fixed) and the second is that investment returns are stochastic.  The
first case will allow us to determine the average contribution rate into the fund necessary
to achieve the MRI from retirement age. The second case recognises that there is some
uncertainty attached to investment returns and to the annuity rates available at retirement
which will lead to a positive probability of the fund being insufficient to meet the MRI in
full. We therefore also calculate the contribution rate needed to meet the MRI with a
specified degree of confidence. (The full set of assumptions used in the projections is
listed in Appendix G).
6.1  Target level for MRI
The target level for the MRI is, as specified in Section 5.2, the best that an individual on
National Average Earnings (NAE) can achieve from membership of the combined State
pension schemes (BSP and SERPS).  In 1999/2000, this amounted to approximately £140
per week.  If the individual is entitled to a full BSP, this leaves a RIR of about £70 per
week to be provided by a second pension plan. Suppose that this second plan is a DC
pension plan.
6.2  Contributions to meet the target level
6.2.1 Deterministic projections
Table 6.1 presents the deterministic projections. It shows that, on average, male
contributions of  £930 per year for 40 years are needed to generate a retirement income of
£70 per week, in constant earnings terms, although by 2040, this will be equivalent to
£127 per week in 2000 prices, since we are projecting that real earnings grow by 1.5% per
annum. Female contributions, as a result of the greater longevity of women, average
£1010 per annum or nearly 9% more than male contributions. However if unisex rates are
used then male contributions rise by £40 per year and female contributions fall by the
same amount. The RIR can be met with contributions equal to 4.7% of NAE.
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Table 6.1  Deterministic projections of the required contributions
Type of annuity Contribution needed
to give an expected
benefit equal to the





Male annuity rates 930 4.5
Female annuity rates 1010 4.9
Unisex annuity rates 970 4.7
          Note:  The projections assume the full Basic State Pension will also be paid
Calculations have also been carried out to find the expected pension resulting from
contributions of £3,600 per annum: this represents the maximum contribution to a
stakeholder pension plan (introduced by the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act (1999))
that does not depend on the level of salary earned during the year in which contributions
are made and amounted to 18% of NAE in 2000. Table 6.2 shows that, using unisex
annuity rates, a pension of £260 per week (equal to 68% of NAE in 2040) can be
achieved on average.
Table 6.2  Deterministic projections for stakeholder pension plans
Type of annuity Pension in constant
earning terms based






earnings in 2040 (%)
Male annuity rates 270 70
Female annuity rates 250 65
Unisex annuity rates 260 68
6.2.2 Stochastic projections
Table 6.3 shows that when investment returns and annuity rates are stochastic, a higher
level of contributions is needed if the target pension is to be achieved with sufficient
confidence. An useful analogy might be a high jump with a bar that moves randomly up
and down. Much greater effort needs to be made to be fairly sure of clearing the randomly
moving bar than would be needed in the case of a fixed bar, even if the moving bar has on
average the same height as the fixed bar.  The table shows that, with unisex annuity rates,
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the annual contribution amount is £1730 if we are to be 75% confident of meeting the
target pension and £2380 if we want to be 90% confident. These are, respectively, 78%
and 145% higher than the deterministic case, indicating the importance of taking the risk
of falling short of the target fully into account.























Male Annuity Rates 1590 7.6 2160 10.4
Female Annuity Rates 1860 8.9 2590 12.5
Unisex Annuity Rates 1730 8.3 2380 11.4
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the distribution of the outcomes from the stochastic model in
the case where contributions of £970 per year are made and unisex annuity rates are used.
This is the contribution amount needed on average to meet the target benefit (see Table
6.1). The range of outcomes varies from a pension of below £40 per week to one
exceeding £300 per week.
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Fig 6.1 Distribution of pension
t(Unisex aged 65 in 2040)








13 41 69 96 124 152 180 208 235 263 291 319 346
Weekly pension (£, 2000 prices).  Target £127 pw







Fig. 6.2 Cumulative distribution of pension
t (Unisex aged 65 in 2040)












13 41 69 96 124 152 180 208 235 263 291 319 346
Weekly pension (£, 2000 prices).  Target £127 pw







7  Proposal:  There Should be Much Greater Freedom over the Use of the Residual
Assets in the Pension Fund
The Report proposes that there should be much greater freedom in the use of the residual
assets in the pension fund. The pension fund is used first to provide a tax-free lump sum
of up to 25% and then to buy an RPI life annuity (or equivalent) to meet the MRI;
individuals could, of course, purchase an annuity for more than the MRI assuming
resources permit. Any remaining assets are denoted the Residual Fund and will continue
to grow on the same tax-privileged basis as present.
7.1  Should there be any limits on the use of the Residual Fund?
Bearing in mind the objective of improving flexibility in the distribution phase, the
Working Party considers that any of the following options for the application of the
Residual Fund both permit greater freedom of choice and form the basis for a coherent
tax system:
1. There should be no restrictions on the application of  the Residual Fund, so that funds
could be drawn at any time subject to income tax at the individual’s highest marginal rate
of tax.
2. There should be a minimum annual withdrawal, but no maximum.
3. There should be a maximum annual withdrawal, but no minimum.
4. There should be both a minimum and maximum annual withdrawal as with income
drawdown.
5. Options 2, 3 and 4 plus a suitable capital charge on the Residual Fund (or on the full
pension fund if the MRI had not already been drawn) at some future age (e.g. 75) unless it
had been used in its entirety to purchase an annuity by this age.
Any withdrawals would be subject to income tax at the individual’s highest marginal rate.
Any Residual Fund remaining at the time of death would be subject to the same rules as
currently exist for income drawdown, as outlined in Section 2.3.2 above. Individuals may
wish to seek professional advice on the tax and investment implications of their
decisions.
It was also felt that the Residual Fund should be excluded from the definition of
exempted assets when it came to State assistance with Long Term Care.
The Report makes no recommendation as to which option should be adopted: the
Working Party offers these options as a starting point for public debate.
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7.2  How should the Residual Fund be invested?
While the assets remain invested, the Report recommends that they should continue to
grow free from income or capital gains tax.  The Report proposes that the rules relating
to the investment of the Residual Fund should be harmonised with those of other savings
and investment media.
One possibility is that individuals choose to have their Residual Fund transferred to an
Individual Retirement Account where the assets are managed in insured funds or in
collective investment schemes, such as unit trusts, investment trusts, UCITS and OEICS.
Such a move would involve extending the PEP and ISA regime to allow authorisation of
PEP and ISA managers as Approved Pension Managers.  Such approval could be done on
a similar basis to that authorising ISA managers.  This would enable such managers to
offer any defined contribution pension product. On reaching retirement, pensioners with
residual assets would be permitted to hold investments as previously, or switch to another
provider.
This flexible system could be combined with other tax-favoured savings vehicles, such as
ISAs, to create a complete life cycle of savings products that will be seen as belonging to
the individual.  We believe that it could also provide appropriate incentives for
individuals to participate in Stakeholder Pension Plans as well as encouraging new
entrants and new product providers in this market.
The Approved Pension Manager would be subject to existing FSA conduct requirements
and would effectively contract with each individual retiree.  The manager would be
required to prepare annual or bi-annual statements detailing reports and results. Retirees
would be able to choose which manager they wish to manage their Residual Fund.  The
retiree could choose to place their entire retirement fund with a single annuity provider or
they could choose to appoint an alternative Approved Pension Manager.
The diagram below illustrates how the structure would operate:
Annuity
Annuity Provider





This new framework will allow investors, if they wish, to remain more fully invested in
equity funds for longer than is currently the case. In the United States similar accounts,
known as IRA rollover accounts are taxed on distribution from the age of 70 ½, following
minimum annual distribution rules based on an annual recalculation of life expectancy of
the individual or their beneficial.  However, while the average return on the invested
assets is likely to be greater initially than the implied return on the annuity, there is some
risk that individuals may be worse off than if they had used the full Residual Fund to
purchase an RPI annuity at the retirement age, especially when the charges for managing
the investment assets are taken into account.  We demonstrate this in the next Section.
8  Stochastic Modelling of Alternative Vehicles for Providing Income in Retirement
A variety of different alternatives to standard annuities have been proposed to provide an
income in retirement.  These alternatives are generally based on obtaining a substantial
investment exposure to equities.  A higher level of equity exposure will give rise to a
higher expected investment return and, inter alia, a higher expected income than an
annuity the income from which is based on the return on bonds.  However, there is also
an increased risk that is not readily appreciated by examining deterministic projections
alone. There are also higher charges. We have performed some stochastic projections to
illustrate the risk and returns which may be achieved by adopting some of the key
alternatives. These are:
1.  Income drawdown with annuity purchased at age 75
2.  Income drawdown with deferred annuity purchased at retirement age and coming into
effect at age 7528
3.  Unit-linked annuity
4.  Flexible unit-linked annuity
5.  With-profit annuity.
The last three are the main examples of investment-linked annuities. In each case, the
projections are applied to a male retiring aged 65 in 2040.  For illustrative purposes
unisex annuity rates have been assumed.  The individual concerned is assumed to have a
fund at retirement sufficient to purchase an RPI annuity that will be equal in size to the
proposed MRI. We will examine the possible outcomes from each of the five alternatives
at age 75 with that which would have obtained had he purchased an RPI annuity at age
65. (The full set of assumptions used in the projections is listed in Appendix H).
It is well known that the outcome from a retirement income vehicle that is primarily
based on equity investment in comparison with that from purchasing an annuity will
depend principally on the relative investment returns of equities and bonds.  In addition to
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the calculations based on the main assumptions, calculations have also been performed to
determine the investment return required to give a 75% probability of the income payable
from the equity-based vehicle exceeding the income that would be payable had an annuity
been purchased at age 65.  Individuals then have to take a view on whether they believe
that such returns are sufficiently likely for them to better off by foregoing  the purchase of
an annuity.
8.1  Five vehicles for providing retirement income
8.1.1   Income drawdown with annuity purchased at age 75
In this case the individual transfers his retirement fund to a managed fund at age 65.  He
then withdraws an income each year equal to that which he would have obtained had he
purchased an annuity at age 65 (if there are sufficient monies in his fund)29.  At age 75 he
uses his entire fund to purchase an annuity.  We again point out that income drawdown is
a very expensive product, with current charges much higher than the 1% we have allowed
for in our stochastic simulations. Nevertheless, we adopt a 1% charge for the simulations
on the expectation that the widespread use of CAT standards30 with help to lower
drawdown charges to this level.
Figs. 8.1 and 8.2 show, respectively, the distribution and cumulative distribution of the
possible sizes of the annuity which could be purchased at age 75 as a proportion of the
annuity payments he would have been receiving at age 75 had he bought an annuity on
retirement at age 65. The figures show that the individual would be likely to do less well
by taking the drawdown route, although there is a 27% chance that he will do better than
the annuity if investment performance turns out to be strong.  There is almost a 10%
probability that his funds would be exhausted by age 75.
An investment return on the managed fund of approximately 9.5% pa in excess of RPI
and expenses would be required to give a 75% probability of an individual adopting
drawdown having an income at 75 in excess of that which could be achieved by
purchasing an annuity at age 65.
8.1.2. Income drawdown with deferred annuity purchased at retirement age and coming
into effect at age 75
In this case the individual purchases a deferred annuity at age 65 which will provide an
income from age 75 equal to that which would be payable at that age from an immediate
annuity bought at age 65.  He invests the Residual Fund at age 65 in a managed fund.  He
then withdraws an income each year equal to that which he would have obtained had he
purchased an annuity at age 65 (if there are sufficient monies in his managed fund).  His
income is secure from age 75 but he may exhaust his fund before then.
29
Fig. 8.1 Distribution of drawdown with annuity
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Fig. 8.2 Cumulative distribution of drawdown with annuity
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Fig. 8.3 Cumulative distribution of surplus fund after deferred
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Fig. 8.3 shows the cumulative distribution of the value of the remaining fund at age 75 as
a proportion of his original fund at age 65.  If the value of the remaining fund is positive
at 75, the individual will be better off than he would have been had  he  simply  purchased
an annuity at age 65.  The figure shows that there is a 65% chance that the funds will be
depleted before the age of 75, but this means that there will be a 35% chance of doing
better than the annuity.
An investment return on the managed fund of approximately 9.25% pa in excess of RPI
and expenses would be required to give a 75% probability of an individual adopting this
approach having a positive fund at age 75.
8.1.3 Unit-linked annuity
In this case the individual uses his retirement fund to purchase a unit-linked annuity at
age 65.  His income will change in line with changes in the price of the underlying units.
It must be recognised that the initial income payable to the individual will be less than
that available from a non-linked annuity but this sacrifice will be offset by faster income
growth with the index-linked annuity if subsequent investment performance is strong.
Fig. 8.4 shows the cumulative distribution of the size of the payments from the unit-
linked annuity payable at age 75 as a proportion of the annuity payments he would have
received at age 75 had he bought an annuity on retirement at age 65. The figure shows
that the individual has a 65% chance of doing less well by taking out a unit-linked
annuity, although this implies that he has a 35% chance of doing better if investment
performance turns out to be strong.
An investment return on the managed fund of approximately 8.75% pa in excess of RPI
and expenses would be required to give a 75% probability of an individual adopting this
approach having a larger income at age 75 than he would have obtained had he bought an
annuity at age 65.
8.1.4.  Flexible unit-linked annuity
In this case the individual uses his retirement fund to purchase a flexible unit-linked
annuity at age 65.  He purchases a number of units in a managed fund.  Each year he
receives a payment from the fund equal to that which he would have obtained had he used
whatever fund remains to purchase an annuity at that time, with the annuity amount being
calculated at an interest rate in line with the returns expected to be obtained on the
managed fund.  This type of annuity therefore differs from a standard unit-linked annuity,
since the payments to the individual are recalculated each year and will depend both on
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Fig.  8.4 Cumulative distribution of unit-linked annuity
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the size of his fund and the prospects for mortality at the time.  The annual payment
includes a ‘survival bonus’  to  the  individual to  reflect the  fact that  he has  survived
for  that year, whereas some other policy holders will have died during the year. This
bonus acts to offset the mortality drag that would otherwise be experienced.
Fig. 8.5 shows the cumulative distribution of the size of the payments from the flexible
unit-linked annuity payable at age 75 as a proportion of the annuity payments he would
have been receiving at age 75 had he bought an annuity on retirement at age 65. The
figure shows that the individual has a 55% chance of doing less well by taking out a
flexible unit-linked annuity, although there is a 45% chance of doing better if investment
performance is strong.
An investment return on the managed fund of approximately 7.50% pa in excess of RPI
and expenses would be required to give a 75% probability of an individual adopting this
approach having a larger income at age 75 than he would have obtained had he bought an
annuity at age 65.
8.1.5.  With-profit annuity
In this case the individual uses his retirement fund to purchase a with-profit annuity at age
65.  The initial payment on the with-profit annuity is calculated using an anticipated
bonus rate.  The subsequent annuity payments will rise or fall depending on the actual
bonus rates declared by the insurance company.
It is recognised that the declared bonus rates of any particular insurance company will
depend on its own policy towards distributing surplus and also its financial strength.  This
means that a general stochastic model of with-profit business is unlikely to be an exact
guide to the bonus experience of any particular insurance company.  In constructing the
stochastic model of a with-profit annuity it has been assumed that the insurer will wish to
make payments on the policy based on smoothed investment returns.  In the model used
here all the bonus rates quoted refer to bonuses in excess of inflation. It has been assumed
that the anticipated bonus rate is 3.5% in real terms, the same as the expected return on
assets net of expenses.  The insurance company has been assumed to declare an annual
bonus rate depending on the realised return on funds invested substantially in equities.
The declared bonus rate will be equal to the real return on these funds unless this is
negative in which case a zero bonus rate will be declared or the real return exceeds 7% in
which case a bonus rate of 7% will be declared31.
Fig. 8.6 shows the cumulative distribution of the size of the payments from the with-
profit annuity payable at age 75 as a proportion of the annuity payments he would have
been receiving at age 75 had he bought an annuity on retirement at age 65. The figure
shows that, as expected, the range of outcomes which might occur is smaller and less
skewed
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Fig. 8.5 Cumulative distribution of flexible unit-linked annuity
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Fig. 8.6 Cumulative distribution of with-profit annuity
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than would result from a unit-linked annuity. There is a 54% probability of doing less
well than with the annuity purchased at 65, but a corresponding 46% chance of doing
better.
An investment return on the underlying assets of approximately 4.25% pa in excess of
RPI and expenses would be required to give a 75% probability of an individual adopting
this approach having a larger income at age 75 than he would have obtained had he
bought an annuity at age 65.
None of these alternatives to annuities generates an assured income by the age of 75 that
is higher than that from the annuity purchased at 65.   The probabilities of failing to do
are summarised in Table 8.1: they range from 73% for income drawdown to 54% for the
with-profit annuity. Corresponding to this, real returns (after charges) of between 9.50%
and 4.25% on the investments need to be generated before these alternatives to the
annuity dominate the annuity with a probability of 75%.
The with-profit annuity dominates the other vehicles. The explanation for this lies in the
smoothed nature of the investment returns associated with with-profit annuities. When
investment performance is disastrous and the value of the fund falls by a significant
amount and assets still have to be sold to pay the pension, the remaining fund can become
so depleted that even with good subsequent performance it might not recover sufficiently
to maintain the pension in future years. This means that high returns can never fully
compensate for poor returns if the fund also has to pay an income stream regardless of
investment performance. Therefore what is needed to achieve (with a high degree of
probability) a higher pension with an equity-based investment than that from a standard
annuity (which is based on the return on bonds) is to have the extremes of returns on the
equity-based investment curtailed.  This is precisely what happens with a with-profit
annuity.  This is confirmed by the second column of Table 8.1 which shows the
probability of failing to do as well as 90% of the annuity purchased at 65: it is just 17%
for the with-profit annuity and much higher for the other products.
The effect is the precise inverse of cost averaging during the accumulation stage of an
investment programme with regular contributions.  During accumulation, the average size
of the terminal fund will be higher if the fund is invested in assets with a high dispersion
of returns than if the fund is invested in assets with a low dispersion of returns but with
the same expected return. This is because there is a greater probability of buying assets at
low prices. During decumulation when a regular income has to be paid from the fund, it is
better to do this from assets with a low dispersion of returns than with assets with a high
dispersion even if the expected returns are the same. This is because there is a bigger
chance of having to sell assets at low prices.
The Working Party felt that once the MRI had been secured, there should be a great deal
more flexibility over the use of the Residual Fund.  But the Working Party also felt that
this flexibility should be based on informed choices taking into account the higher costs
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and risks of the alternatives as well as their higher expected returns from their greater
equity investment.  This section demonstrates very clearly the importance of securing the
MRI before it is sensible to consider alternatives to annuities.  It also clearly demonstrates
the very high risks associated with income drawdown and the potential benefits of with-
profit annuities.  Guaranteed with-profit annuities, which offer a minimum annual
income, could be an even better retirement product.
Table 8.1  Summary of the performance of the alternative vehicles to a
standard annuity for a male aged 75
Probability of
failing to do



























Unit-linked annuity 63 53 8.75
Flexible unit-linked annuity 55 48 7.50
With-profit annuity 54 17 4.25
* Guaranteed to match 100% of the annuity purchased at 65 by means of a deferred
annuity payable from age 75.
9  Proposal: Measures Should be Taken to Improve the Design of Annuities
The Report proposes that measures should be taken to improve the design of annuities
for those who choose to use their Residual Fund to purchase annuities at some stage.
With the Minimum Retirement Income having been secured through the purchase of an
RPI annuity (or equivalent) at Retirement Age, this will allow the life assurance industry
to become much more innovative in the management of the Residual Fund. This new
freedom would, in turn, require a relaxation in legislative restrictions, including those on
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international competition in the domestic annuity market.  It would also require a
recognition of the current deficiency of the financial markets in providing long-term cost-
effective risk management tools, as evidenced, for example,  by the high costs of running
a derivatives portfolio or by derivatives of insufficient duration to hedge long-term risks.
As outlined in Section 4, the main risks that require hedging effectively and economically
are interest rate risk, inflation risk and longevity risk. Another important feature of the
design is charging structures. Greater flexibility in regulations is also needed.
9.1  Interest rate risk
Until very recently, the insurance industry (especially in Europe) has been reluctant to
offer products that help annuitants hedge the risks, especially interest rate risk, that they
have been forced to assume themselves.  Yet a whole range of financial instruments and
strategies is available (at least in theory) to help them immunise interest rate risk32.
9.1.1  Phased annuities
The simplest strategy is a planned programme of phased deferred annuity purchases in the
period leading up to retirement (say one per year in the five-year period leading up to
retirement), using the principle of cost averaging. An alternative strategy would be keep
the fund fully invested up to retirement, but have a planned programme of annuity
purchases over a specified period after retirement.
9.1.2  Adjustable annuities
Another simple strategy would be adjustable annuities which rebases rates periodically
(say every three years).
9.1.3  Protected annuity funds
A more sophisticated form of pre-retirement planning is protected annuity funds which
employ derivative instruments.
One example places a fraction (e.g., 95%) of the funds on deposit and the rest in call
options on bond futures contracts: if interest rates fall during the life of the option, the
profit on the options will compensate for the reduced interest rate.
Another example places a fraction of the funds in bonds and the rest in call options on an
equity index, thereby gaining from any rise in the stock market over the life of the
options.
9.1.4  Investment-linked annuities
Investment-linked annuities provide a potential solution for individuals with a high
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degree of risk tolerance.  As we showed in Section 8.3 above, there is some chance that
individuals can end up with a larger pension from investment-linked annuities than from
level or indexed annuities. However, as we also showed, the charges with investment-
linked annuities also tend to be much higher than with standard annuities.
9.1.5  Individual retirement accounts with longevity insurance
This suggestion would enable individuals to keep their pension fund fully invested in
insured fundsor in collective investment schemes without having to purchase an annuity
at any particular age. They would separately insure against running out of resources
before they die. The greater transparency with this structure might lead to lower charges
than with a formal annuity.
9.2 Inflation risk
The government could also do more to ameliorate some of the market failures in the
private provision of annuities which arise, in part, from aggregate risks that are beyond
the abilities and resources of private insurance companies to hedge.  A number of
proposals have been suggested recently to help the private sector hedge inflation risk.
9.2.1  Deferred income government securities
For example, in order to help the private sector hedge against inflation risk more
effectively, the Goode Report (1993, Sec. 4.4.44) in the UK suggested that the
government introduce a new type of  bond, with income and capital linked to the retail
price index, but with payment of income deferred for a period.  Such bonds were given
the name Deferred Income Government Securities (DIGS).  DIGS could be introduced
with different starting and termination dates and would allow all deferred pensions to be
indexed to prices.  DIGS have not so far been introduced in the UK, although the
introduction of the government bond (gilt) strips market in 1997 could help UK insurance
companies construct DIGS synthetically.
9.2.2  Limited price index bonds
The introduction of ‘limited price index bonds’ would simplify the provision of annuities
that were subject to Limited Price Indexation.
9.3  Adverse selection and longevity risk
The main causes of private market failure in annuity provision are the risks associated
with adverse selection and longevity.
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9.3.1  Mandatory membership of second-pillar pension plans
Mandatory membership of second-pillar pension plans would do much to remove the
adverse selection bias in the demand for annuities by bringing the select group that
purchases annuities closer to that of the population as a  whole.
9.4  Underestimating increases in longevity
If the adverse selection bias is removed, increases in longevity amongst annuitants would
correspond more closely to those of the population as a whole. In other words, while there
would be aggregate risks associated with longevity increases, there would be fewer
specific risks.
9.4.1  Survivor bonds
The State could help private sector annuity providers hedge the aggregate longevity risks
that they face by issuing Survivor Bonds, a suggestion made in Blake, Burrows and
Orszag (1999).
These are bonds whose future coupon payments depend on the percentage of the
population of retirement age on the issue date of each bond who are still alive on the date
of each future coupon payment.  For a bond issued in 2000, for instance, the coupon in
2010 will be directly proportional to the amount, on average, that an insurance company
has to pay out as an annuity at that time.
The insurance company which buys such a security bears no aggregate longevity risk and,
as a consequence, cost loadings fall.
The insurance company would still retain the specific risk associated with the pool of
annuitants that purchase its annuities (e.g., it might explicitly market annuities to groups
such as non-smokers who can be expected to experience lighter than average mortality),
but this is likely to be a smaller and more forecastable risk than the risk associated with
underestimating aggregate longevity increases many years ahead.
Initial soundings from UK Treasury officials and insurance companies, however, indicate
some hostility to the concept of survivor bonds.  The UK Treasury has an obligation to
raise funds at the lowest cost to the tax payer and an insurance company representative on
the Working Party argued that the government has absolutely no reason to issue them
‘unless they want to take over the role of the insurance industry’.  The idea has found
more favour outside the UK, however, especially in the US and also in some former
Soviet-block countries where mortality data is non-existent and they are seen as one way
of kick-starting a private sector insurance industry.
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9.5  Simplifying charging structures
Charging structures for products such as income drawdown lack transparency: they can be
complex and confusing.  Very few consumers understand their full significance,
especially the high front loads that are extracted and the disguised way in which annual
charges are imposed. The Report notes that the introduction of CAT-marking for
stakeholder pensions may eventually extend to other retail financial products.
9.6  More flexible annuity regulations
The Report recommends that annuity regulations need to be made more flexible to allow
individuals to choose the kind of options outlined in Section 4.1.8 above.
10  Wider Implications of These Proposals
Our proposals have a number of wider implications.
First, they could alter the behaviour of members of other types of pension plans. For
example, they might provide an incentive for members of final salary schemes to convert
to DC plans just prior to retirement.  This incentive increases the greater the difference
between the final salary pension and the MRI.
Second, they might change the nature of the annuity market.  On the one hand, if only
relatively small sums need to be annuitised, scale economies are not fully exploited and
this raises unit costs.  On the other hand, if everyone has to annuitise at retirement age,
this will help to bring annuitant mortality rates closer to those of the population as a
whole and this will help to improve annuity rates. It is not clear what the net effect will
be.
Third, with a steady increase in the size of the DC pensions market over time, there will
be a commensurate increase in the demand for annuities and hence in the demand for
suitable matching assets.  A key question is: will there be an adequate supply in the future
of appropriate financial instruments to match the rising demand for annuities? Some
commentators have argued that the future supply from traditional sources will not be
adequate.  For example, Bishop (1999)33 demonstrates that in 1999 the market for long
sterling bonds was severely distorted by two factors: a near balance in the UK
government’s finances which has reduced the supply of new long gilts and a high demand
for gilts from life and pension funds to back both annuity sales and the Minimum
Funding Requirement34 of the 1995 Pensions Act. As a result, 10-year yields in the UK
were 3 percentage points below those of Euroland.  The restrictions on the PSBR and
National Debt imposed by the Maastricht Treaty35 make it unlikely that life and pension
funds can rely on the UK government providing a sustainable long-term source of gilts in
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the future.  New sources must therefore be sought both domestically and internationally.
On the domestic scene, growth in the non-gilt sterling bond market needs to be
encouraged.  For example, the utilities (such as the gas, electricity and water companies)
are natural issuers of indexed bonds, since their regulators allow their charges to be
indexed to inflation; to date, though, the corporate index-linked bond market is just £1bn
in size with £503m of this accounted for by a British Gas issue in December 1999.  The
current very low real long term interest rates might encourage more such issues.
Similarly, in a period of low sustainable inflation, the size of the UK corporate bond
market might begin to rise towards that of the US (relative to GDP) and this would
provide another important source of supply. On the international scene, a greater use of
currency swaps needs to be encouraged.
In any event, the present and likely future shortage of gilts helps to justify our proposal
that the pension fund should be annuitised only up to the level needed to meet the MRI.
11 Conclusion
In principle, a defined contribution pension plan is a very straightforward financial
product: there is an accumulation stage during the working lifetime, followed by
retirement and then a decumulation stage. However, current arrangements have resulted
in a complex set of choices at the point of retirement. Should an individual buy a level
annuity or an indexed annuity? Should they delay this choice and instead use drawdown?
Most individuals are confronted with these choices without having a clear idea of the
benefits or the risks or the costs involved. This underlines the importance of the conduct
of business rules and the risk warnings given to customers. The proposals in this Report
seek to clarify the arrangements at the retirement age with the security of the pension
being a primary objective, but at the same time allow much greater flexibility if
circumstances permit.
The simple answer to the question of whether there is a realistic alternative to life
annuities in defined contribution pension plans is: no, not really. The real questions are:
what is the minimum acceptable level of annuitisation?, how should the State recover the
tax breaks during the retirement phase of the plan?, and how can current shortcomings of
annuities and annuity regulations be removed or ameliorated?
This Report has attempted to answer these questions in the following manner.  It proposes
that individuals should be required to purchase RPI life annuities (or their equivalent)
only up to the same level of income as the State’s current second pension SERPS36: after
all, the objective of the contracting out requirements is to end up with a pension broadly
comparable with SERPS benefits foregone.
Above this level, there can be much greater flexibility in the manner in which the
remaining funds are drawn down.  The Report lists a number of ways in which flexibility
can be improved, but does not recommend any particular way.
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However, the greater desired flexibility in retirement provision that we seek can only be
fully achieved if the State and the financial services industry become more innovative.
The State should establish an institutional framework for the pension annuity business
that offers the appropriate incentives for annuity providers to compete effectively and
economically. One aspect of this would be to make second pensions mandatory, since this
would help to reduce the costs associated with both adverse selection and the marketing
of voluntary arrangements. Another would be to establish a life-long education campaign
beginning in schools.  Another would be to relax the restrictive regulations surrounding
annuities.
The financial services industry should also show greater innovation in using existing
financial instruments and established investment management strategies to help its
customers hedge risks such as interest rate risk.
Finally, we believe that it is important to point out that, although we have suggested
improvements in the security and flexibility of pension plans during the retirement stage,
no improvements at this stage can adequately compensate for insufficient contributions
made into a pension plan during the accumulation stage. Suggestions for improving
security and flexibility during retirement will make little difference if the fund
accumulated on the retirement date is a small one.
Glossary
Adverse Selection
This is the risk that individuals who believe that they are likely to live longer than the
average for the population of the same age will be more likely to voluntarily choose to
purchase annuities.
Annuity
A life annuity is a financial contract that provides regular income to the annuity purchaser
for his or her remaining life. The different types of annuities commonly sold are
explained in Appendix A to this Report.
Basic State Pension (BSP)
The flat rate State pension paid to all who have met the minimum National Insurance
contribution requirements.  A widow, widower or in some cases a married woman may
also claim a Basic State Pension on the contribution record of his or her spouse.
Capital Protected Annuity
An annuity which, on death, returns the excess of the purchase price over the payments
the annuitant has already received.
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CAT standards
The standards for charges-access-terms that have been applied to Independent Savings
Accounts (ISAs) and stakeholder pension plans.
Deferred Annuity
An annuity which commences from a future date.
Defined Benefit (DB) Pension Scheme
A pension scheme in which the rules specify the benefits to be paid, and the scheme is
financed accordingly.
Defined Contribution (DC) Pension Scheme
A pension scheme in which the determination of an individual member’s benefits is by
reference to contributions paid into the scheme in respect of that member, usually
increased by an amount based on the investment return on those contributions.
Deterministic Model
A model in which the factors driving the model (e.g. asset returns in an investment
programme) are assumed not to vary over time.
Deferred Income Government Securities (DIGS)
A type of  bond, with income and capital linked to the retail price index, but with
payment of income deferred for a period.
Flexible Unit Linked Annuity
A type of unit linked annuity where the payments to the annuitant are recalculated each
year and depend on the size of the fund and the prospects for mortality at the time.  In
addition, the annual payment includes a ‘survival bonus’ to the annuitant to reflect the
fact that he/she has survived for that year, whereas some other policy holders will have
died during the year.
Income Drawdown
An arrangement whereby individuals are permitted to draw an income from a pension
fund for a specified period, before purchasing a standard annuity.
Index Linked Annuity
An escalating annuity where the payments are increased in line with increases in the retail
price index.
Life Annuity
An annuity where payments continue until the death of the annuitant.
Limited Price Indexation (LPI)
A rate of pension increase which is in line with RPI, but with a maximum of 5% p.a.
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Joint-Survivor Annuity
An annuity where payments continue until the death of the second life.
Lower Earnings Limit (LEL)
The income level below which National Insurance contributions are not payable.  It is
broadly equal to the single person’s Basic State Pension.  SERPS benefits are based on
earnings above the LEL, and up to the Upper Earnings Limit.
Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG)
A minimum income guarantee to pensioners through Income Support.
Minimum Funding Requirement
A requirement introduced in the 1995 Pensions Act for defined benefit pension schemes
to aim for a minimum level of funding using a prescribed method and basis of
calculation.
Minimum Retirement Income (MRI)
The level of retirement income which this Report recommends should be met by means
of an RPI life annuity.
Monte Carlo Simulation
Repeated simulation of a stochastic model. The purpose is to generate a distribution of
outcomes for a variable of interest (e.g., the terminal fund size from an investment
programme).
Mortality Cross Subsidy
This is a cross-subsidy allowed for in annuity rates which arises because some annuitants
will die shortly after taking out an annuity thereby releasing a ‘mortality profit’ which
insurance companies share with longer-surviving annuitants.
Mortality Drag
This is the term for the extra returns which must be earned on a drawdown product to
offset the lack of any mortality profit.
Mortality Profit
See Mortality Cross Subsidy.
Normal Distribution
A well known bell-shaped statistical distribution which can act as an approximation to the
distribution of investment returns available from some financial instruments.
Occupational Pension Scheme
An arrangement organised by an employer to provide pensions and/or other benefits for
or in respect of one or more employees on leaving service or on death-in-service or in
retirement.
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Pay-as-you-go Pension Plan (PAYG)
An arrangement under which benefits are paid out of the current contributions of active
members and no funding is made for future liabilities.
Personal Pension Scheme
A pension arrangement available to individuals who are self-employed, or employed but
not members of an occupational pension scheme.
Residual Income Requirement (RIR)
This is the amount that needs to be annuitised from a DC pension fund according to the
recommendations of this Report. It is the difference between the MRI and the sum of
certain other sources of income which have been adjusted to be equivalent to index linked
incomes.  The relevant sources of income are those that are payable for the remaining life
of the individual.
Residual Fund
The original fund at retirement less the tax-free lump sum and less the purchase price of
the MRI annuity.
State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) Pension
The additional or supplementary earnings-related pension available from the State. Will
be replaced by the State Second Pension in 2002.
State Pension Age
The age from which pensions are normally payable by the State scheme, currently age 65
for men and age 60 for women.  State pension age is to be equalised at age 65.  The
increase in woman’s pension age will be phased in between 2010 and 2020.
Step Down Annuity
This is an annuity that reduces to specified levels at particular dates in the future.
Stochastic Model
A model in which the factors driving the model (e.g. asset returns in an investment
programme) are assumed vary randomly over time.
Survivor Bonds
These are bonds whose future coupon payments depend on the percentage of the
population of retirement age on the issue date of each bond who are still alive on the date
of each future coupon payment.
Unisex Annuity Rates
Annuity rates which do not distinguish between gender.
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Unit Linked Annuity
This is an annuity in which the capital sum is invested in unit-linked funds (unit trusts or
other mutual funds) and each year a fixed number of units are sold to provide the annuity.
Upper Earnings Limit (UEL)
The maximum amount of earnings (equal to approximately seven times the lower
earnings limit) on which National Insurance contributions are payable by employees.
With-Profit Annuity
This is an annuity in which the capital sum is invested in the with-profit fund of an
insurance company and the annuity is based on an assumed or anticipated annual bonus
(or crediting) rate.
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Appendix A – Types of Annuities37.
A.1  Purchase arrangements
Single-premium annuity: the cost of the annuity is paid in a single lump sum.
Regular-premium (or instalment) annuity: the cost of the annuity (which by definition
will be a deferred annuity) is paid by regular instalments (either in the form of fixed
premiums or flexible premiums).  It is rather like an integrated defined contribution
pension scheme. During the accumulation stage, there is both an accumulation value and
a surrender value.  The accumulation value equals the premiums paid plus investment
returns less expenses. The surrender value is equal to the accumulation value less a
surrender charge which typically reduces to zero at the end of the surrender charge period.
Should the policy holder die during the accumulation stage, the surrender value of the
policy goes to the policy holder’s estate; similarly, the policy holder can make a
withdrawal up to the surrender value during the accumulation period.  A variation on this
is the:
Two-tier annuity: the accumulation value will be received only if the policy is
subsequently annuitised for a minimum period (eg 5 years), and the surrender value is
always less than the accumulation value to discourage early withdrawal.
A. 2  Coverage
Single-life annuity: payments cease on the death of the annuitant (without refund of the
balance of capital).
Joint-life annuity: payments cease when the first of the lives covered dies; the second life
receives no further payments after this date.
Joint-and-last-survivor annuity (or simply a joint-survivor annuity): payments continue
until the death of the second life (usually the surviving spouse). Typically, after the death
of the first annuitant, the annuity continues at a lower rate, eg, one-half or two-thirds. The
size of the annuity depends on the age difference between the two lives.
Survivor (or reversionary) annuity: payments begin on the death of the nominator (the
covered life) and continue until the death of  the beneficiary of the policy (called the
annuitant), unless the beneficiary dies first, in which case the policy expires worthless.
Group annuity: covers a group of individuals, such as the employees of a company, not
necessarily by name, rather by characteristics (such as age and sex).
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A. 3  Variations
Temporary annuity: payments are made for a fixed period or until the annuitant dies,
whichever is sooner.
Certain annuity: payments are made for a fixed period, whether or not the annuitant dies.
Whole annuity: payments continue until the annuitant dies.
Annuity with minimum guarantee (period-certain annuity): payments are made for a
minimum period (eg, 5 or 10 years), however long the annuitant lives.
Annuity with minimum guarantee and overlap: the spouse’s income and income during
the guarantee period are paid simultaneously.
Annuity with proportion: on the death of the annuitant, the proportion owing since the
last payment is paid (important feature if annuity is paid annually).
Annuity with capital protection: the balance of the capital is paid to the annuitant’s estate
when s/he dies. Variations on this include:
Cash-refund annuity: the balance of the capital is paid as a lump sum.
Instalment-refund annuity: the balance of the capital is paid in instalments.
A.4  Other Features
Health: Impaired life annuities: where the prospective annuitant is expected to experience
heavier mortality than the average annuitant (say as a result of a fatal illness or, indeed, as
a result of lifestyle, such as being a smoker), higher than standard annuity rates apply.
Long term care: Long term care annuities have a long term care insurance policy attached
to them to provide for potential future nursing fees.
Gender: Uni-sex annuities: the annuity rate is the same for males and females.  With
conventional annuities, for a given purchase price, the annuity payable to a male exceeds
that to a female on account of the generally heavier mortality experienced by males.  Uni-
sex annuities therefore involve a cross-subsidy from men to women.
Tax: Compulsory purchase annuities (CPAs):  the full amount of the annuity is subject to
income tax.  In countries, such as the UK, which operate an EET tax system for their
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pension arrangements (ie, contributions into the pension scheme are Exempted from tax,
investment returns are Exempted from tax, but the pension in payment is Taxed), it is
usually mandatory in DC schemes to use the lump sum on the retirement date to purchase
a life annuity; because of the tax subsidy involved in generating this lump sum, the full
amount of the annuity is taxed as income. In contrast, the voluntary purchase of a life
annuity is typically made from post-tax resources.  Such annuities are known as
purchased life annuities (PLAs). Recognising that an annuity payment involves both an
income element and a return of capital element, the tax authorities only tax the income
element in the case of PLAs.
A.5 Payment Terms
Timing of payments:
Immediate annuity (annuity in arrears): payments commence at the end of the first
period.
Annuity-due (annuity in advance): payments commence at the beginning of the first
period.
Deferred annuity: first payment is delayed for a number of periods.
Phased annuities (phased or staggered vesting): a series of annuities are purchased at
regular intervals.
Payment frequency: monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, annual.
Currency of denomination: domestic currency or key foreign currencies.
Payment types:
Level annuity: pays a fixed amount in nominal terms for the duration of the annuity. All
other types of annuity pay variable amounts.
Step Down Annuity: an annuity that reduces to specified levels at particular dates in the
future.
Adjustable Annuity: an annuity which rebases rates periodically (say every three years).
Escalating annuity: an example is a constant-growth annuity, where the annuity increases
annually at a fixed rate of, say, 5%. The starting payment is much lower than with a level
annuity costing the same amount.
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Index-linked annuity: an example of an escalating annuity where the payments are
increased in line with increases in the retail price index.
Limited price indexed (LPI) annuity: this compensates for inflation up to a stated limit
(eg, 5% per annum compound).
Investment-linked annuities: The best known example of these in the US are known as
‘variable annuities’.  They were first issued in 1952 in the US by the TIAA-CREF38.
A lump sum is used to buy units in a diversified fund of assets (mainly equities) and the
units are sold on a regular basis to provide the annuity.  The size of the annuity depends
on the income and growth rate of assets in the fund.  The annuity can fall if the value of
the assets falls substantially, so there is some volatility to the annuity in contrast with a
level annuity. But since the pension from a level annuity is based on the return on
government bonds, it is possible that the pension from a investment-linked annuity, based
on the return on equities, will generate a higher overall income (assuming that the
duration of the annuity is sufficiently great and that the charges on investment-linked are
not excessive).
Examples of investment-linked annuities in the UK are with-profit and unit-linked
annuities, but only a few insurance companies offer them.  They allow a wider range of
investments, including equities, and produce an income related to the performance of the
underlying assets. This can either be via a with-profit fund or a conventional unit-linked
fund.
With-profit annuity: the capital sum is invested in an insurance company’s with-profit
fund and the annuity is based on an assumed or anticipated annual bonus (or crediting)
rate (eg 8%). The initial payment is lower than with an equivalent level annuity, but is
higher the higher the assumed bonus, although, as a consequence, the subsequent rate of
increase in the annuity is lower. However, the annuity could fall in value if the assumed
bonus rate turns out to exceed the actual declared bonus rate.  Some providers offer a
two-tier bonus system: an annual reversionary bonus, which, once declared, cannot be
removed, and an annual terminal bonus, which applies only for the year in question and
can be raised or reduced in subsequent years. Although the annuity can fluctuate, with-
profit annuities normally provide a guaranteed minimum annuity. They are considered
less risky than unit linked due to the ‘smoothing’ effect of a with-profit fund.   Funds are
subject to other charges such as an annual management fee, a policy fee and in some
cases a set-up fee.  A recent innovation is the guaranteed with-profit annuity which
provides a minimum annual income whatever the underlying investment performance.
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Example of with-profit annuity39
Male aged 65 uses £100,000 to purchase a single-life with-profit immediate annuity with

























No bonus is declared in the first four years, so the annuity payments must fall.  In years
5-10, the actual bonus exceeds the anticipated bonus, and this allows the annuity
payments to rise.  In years 11-12, the anticipated and declared bonuses are the same and
so the annuity payments remain unchanged.  From year 13 on, the bonuses vary year by
year and the annuity rises or falls accordingly.
Unit-linked annuity: the capital sum is invested in unit-linked funds (unit trusts or mutual
funds) and each year a fixed number of units are sold to provide the annuity. The initial
payment is lower than with an equivalent level annuity. The annuity either fluctuates in
line with unit trust (or mutual fund) prices, or is assumed to grow at a constant rate, eg,
10% pa; in the latter case, if investment performance is lower than this, the income from
the annuity falls and vice versa, in a similar manner to the with-profit annuity. If a unit-
linked annuity is selected, the purchase price is exchanged for a number of units in an
investment fund at retirement. Some unit-linked funds (e.g, the Ariadne fund) guarantee a
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minimum performance in line with a particular index. Such a guarantee would improve
the attractiveness of unit-linked annuities.
Income drawdown or managed annuity (also known as managed pension or income
withdrawal or deferred annuity purchase): the capital sum remains invested in a fund and
individuals are permitted to draw an income from the fund for a specified period, before
purchasing a standard annuity.  They were first introduced in the UK as a result of the
1995 Finance Act, following an unprecedented fall in government bond yields and hence
annuity rates during the early 1990s: individuals retiring during this period were locking
themselves into very low level-annuities. In the case of the UK, individuals can delay
drawing an annuity until age 75, during which time they can draw an income from the
fund that is between 35% and 100% of that available from a single-life level annuity.
Tables for doing this are supplied by the Government Actuary, and the arrangements have
to be reviewed triennially. If the individual dies before the annuity is purchased: the
individual’s spouse can continue using the drawdown facility until age 75 and if s/he, in
turn, dies before this age, the balance of the fund forms part of his/her estate; or the
spouse can purchase a standard annuity; or the balance of the fund can be received as a
lump sum, subject to a 35% capital charge.  There are various costs or risks associated
with drawdown. First, annuity rates might actually be lower by the time the individual
reaches 75.  Second, investment performance during the deferral period might be poor
with the result that the fund  falls in value.  Third, by not buying an annuity, individuals
forego a ‘mortality cross-subsidy’ (a cross-subsidy allowed for in annuity rates which
arises because some annuitants will die shortly after taking out an annuity thereby
releasing a ‘mortality profit’ which insurance companies share with longer-surviving
annuitants): the mortality cross-subsidy is cumulative over time, and by delaying the
purchase of an annuity, individuals experience a so-called ‘mortality drag’ (see Appendix
C below).  Finally, the charges with income drawdown are higher than for annuities. For
example, the following charges are extracted on its drawdown policies by National
Mutual Life, which has been voted one of the top policies by Sherwood Planned Savings
over last two years:
Set-up charge                                                             £50
Bid-offer spread                                                          5%
Minimum allocation rates                                            98% on funds between £10,000
                                                                                   and £49,999; 98.5% on funds
                                                                                   exceeding £50,000
Drawdown charge                                                       £5.00 per month for stand-alone
                                                                                    non-Protected  Rights  or              
                                                                                     Protected Rights40 drawdown
                                                                                    policy(ies).  Additional £2.50 per
                                                                                    month if Protected Rights is part of
                                                                                    a larger transfer value received
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Investment management charge                                   between 0.39% and 0.96% of the  
                                                                                   fund value per annum depending on
                                                                                   the unit trust chosen by the             
                                                                                   individual
Additional charge made by cancellation of units          up to 1% per annum
Charge for changing  the level of income drawn          £50 (the first change in any one
                                                                                   year is free).
Market-value-adjusted (MVA) annuity: a hybrid arrangement for a deferred annuity lying
between a fixed and variable annuity. The annuity rate is fixed for a specified period, but
the surrender value of the policy adjusts in line with the market value of the underlying
investments if it is surrendered before the end of this period. At regular intervals (eg
every 5 years), a window opens enabling a withdrawal to be made without a MVA.
Appendix B – Summary of Annuity Arrangements in Some Key Overseas Markets.
B.1  The US41
B.1.1 Background
The US pensions system is complex with the State, employers and individuals all playing
important roles.
B.1.1.1 The State system
State retirement benefits are available from the Social Security system.  Social security
benefits are available to people who have worked for at least ten years.  They are based on
earnings averaged over most of an individual’s working life (somewhat like SERPS in the
UK). The formula for calculating benefits is somewhat complex, but a worker with
average earnings can expect a retirement benefit that represents about 42 percent of his or
her average lifetime earnings.  Low income workers can expect a higher percentage and
high income workers a lower percentage (Social Security Administration Publications
(1999)).
There is a mechanism for assuring a minimum monthly income for elderly and disabled
persons who have few assets.  This is known as Supplemental Security Income Benefits
and it supplements income up to a basic rate set by the federal government.  Some states
supplement this amount.  This benefit is very strictly means tested (Social Security
Administration Publications (1999)).
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B.1.1.2 Employer-sponsored retirement plans
There is tax relief on contributions and investment returns.  Income tax is payable on
retirement benefits.
In the past most plans were defined benefit arrangements.  Defined benefit arrangements
are often set up to provide an income for life, but this is not obligatory.  The entire benefit
can be paid as a lump sum.  There is no obligation to buy an annuity.
Today most companies offer defined contribution arrangements.   There are 2 common
forms:
1.  401(k) plans = for employees in private companies
2.  403(b) plans = for employees in public and non-profit organisations.
The employee decides the contribution and how it is invested. The employer may match
contributions at, say, 25c or 50c (or even $1) per employee $1 contributed. Employee
contribution limit (1999) is $10k pre-tax for 401(k) plans and the lesser of 20% or $9,500
of salary for 403(b) plans.
The employee can make additional contributions of taxed dollars, typically up to a total of
12% of salary.  The investment growth is still tax free.  In the case of after-tax
contributions, when the corresponding benefits are distributed the contributions are
treated as a non-taxable return of capital, but all investment earnings are treated as
income.
It is common for 401(k) plans to provide at least some participant-directed investment.
The types of investments are not restricted, but various fiduciary responsibilities are
imposed on the plan operators (the so-called ‘prudent man’ principle) under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
The employee can borrow money from a 401(k) for any reason, at a prescribed interest
rate with an agreed repayment term.  Failure to repay invokes a tax liability.  It is
common for plans to allow specified ‘hardship’ withdrawals.
Draw down must start between 59½ and 70½ (or on retirement if later).  The employee
may be given the choice between pension payments or a single lump sum.  Plans typically
offer a lump sum and may also provide for payments over a period of years, such as the
life expectancy of the participant and his/her beneficiary.  The lump sum can be used by
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an individual to create an income in retirement: for example, he/she may buy an annuity
from an insurer at market rates or buy long-dated Treasury bills.
Most 401(k) plans do not offer annuity options because of the increased administrative
burdens associated with annuities.  For example, plans that offer an annuity are subject to
‘joint and survivor requirements’ under which a spouse must continue to receive
payments after the death of the pensioner (Senate Committee (1999), p.12).  If an annuity
is not offered there are no requirements specifying a particular death benefit.  The
member’s nominated beneficiary is entitled to the remaining account balance upon the
member’s death.
B.1.1.3 Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
There are a number of types of IRAs.
Traditional IRAs
These are available to people with employment income. The maximum annual
contribution is $2,000 (this limit applies to the total contributions to both traditional and
Roth - IRAs).  In some circumstances the non-working spouse of a member may
contribute to another IRA. There are complex rules for deciding whether contributions are
tax deductible.  Broadly speaking contributions are deductible if the individual has no
participation in a company-sponsored retirement plan.  Investment growth is tax deferred.
Distributions from pre-tax contributions are taxed as income.  Distributions from post-tax
contributions are treated as a non-taxable return of capital apart from any investment
growth which is taxed as income. Individuals can assign the benefits to their children
upon their death but these will be taxed. Transfers known as ‘rollovers’ can be accepted
from employer plans when changing employer.
Draw down must start between 59½ and 70½.  There is no requirement to buy an annuity.
At age 70½ the individual must take a required minimum distribution (RMD) annually or
be subject to penalties.  The RMD is determined by a formula applied to the individual’s
life expectancy or the joint life expectancy of the individual and his or her beneficiary.
Roth - IRAs
These are available to people with incomes below a certain level (less than $110,000 for a
single person) in the particular year of contribution. The maximum annual contribution is
$2,000 (this limit applies to the total contributions to traditional and Roth IRAs). In some
circumstances, the non-working spouse of a member may contribute to his/her own IRA.
Contributions are not tax deductible.  Investment growth is tax free. Distributions are free
of tax if the account has been open for more than 5 years and the investor’s age is greater
than 59½).  So long as the account has been open for five years up to $10,000 can be
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withdrawn tax free to purchase a first home. There is no age by which the individual must
start drawing income.  It is possible for an individual to assign the payments to his/her
children upon death, tax free.
SEP - IRA (Simplified Employee Pension IRA)
These are for the employees of small businesses.  Contributions are made by the
employer, up to 15% of each employee’s total compensation, with a maximum annual
contribution of $24,000.  With the exception of the higher contribution limits, they are
subject to the same rules as a traditional IRA.
SIMPLE - IRA (Savings Incentive Match Plan for Employees IRA)
These are for the employees of small businesses (fewer than 100 employees).  Both the
employee and the employer may contribute to the plan.  The maximum employee
contribution is $6,000.  If the employees contribute to the plan the maximum employer
contribution is the lesser of 3% of the employee’s compensation and an equal match of
the employee’s contributions.  If the employees do not contribute to the plan the
maximum employer contribution is 2% of each employee’s compensation.  With the
exception of the different contribution limits, these plans are subject to the same rules as
a traditional IRA.
Keogh plans
These are for the self employed.  In a Profit-Sharing Keogh, contributions are limited to
the lesser of $30,000 or 13.4% of the individual’s income from self employment.  The
contribution percentage can be adjusted yearly.  In a Money Purchase Keogh, an
individual can contribute 20% of income up to a maximum of $30,000.  In this case,
however, the contribution percentage cannot be changed from year to year. With the
exception of the different contribution limits, these plans are subject to the same rules as
a traditional IRA.
With all the different types of IRA and Keogh plans, the member normally has a wide
choice of investments such as stocks, mutual funds, bonds or strips to hold inside the
shell.
If an individual wishes to take the benefit in the form of an immediate annuity he/she may
use the IRA/Keogh assets to purchase an annuity in the market.  In this case, income tax




There are differences in terminology between the US and the UK. In the US, an annuity is
a tax-deferred investment vehicle packaged as an insurance product.  Within an annuity
package the investment earnings are tax-deferred until the money is withdrawn.  Thus
money invested in an annuity grows faster than in a taxable account.  Contributions to an
annuity are not tax deductible.  There are no limits to the amounts that can be contributed
to an annuity.
An annuity has two phases: the accumulation phase and the distribution phase.  During
the accumulation phase, individuals can contribute as much as they wish and the earnings
grow tax deferred.  During the distribution phase, individuals can elect to receive a lump
sum or can ‘annuitize’ which means that the annuity can be turned into a series of
payments for a specified period.  There are few, if any, restrictions on the series of
payments that are possible.
There are many common permutations, some examples of which are set out below:
1. The single life annuity provides highest annuity payment per invested dollar but ends at
death.
2.  A ‘life and “n” year’ annuity provides that in the event of an early death, payments
continue to a beneficiary for the remainder of the n years.
3. A ‘revocable’ annuity lets the individual exchange the remaining income payments for
a lump sum at any time on period-certain contracts (not lifetime).
Fixed immediate annuities provide a set return backed by an insurance company.
Variable Immediate Annuities (VIAs) are tied to an underlying equity-based account. In
return for a one off payment, an annuity is guaranteed for life, but payments are adjusted
in line with the equity account performance.  However, VIAs are not very popular
compared with fixed immediate annuities.
Distributions and withdrawals from annuities are generally taxed as income.  In broad
terms, annuities in the US are similar to a traditional IRA except that contributions are
not tax deductible.
B.1.2 Role of annuities in the US pension system
In the US pension system, there is no compulsion from the State for retirement income  to
be received in the form of income from annuity arrangements.  There is a great deal of
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freedom regarding the manner in which income can be received in retirement.  To a large
extent individuals are able to choose arrangements that suit their own particular
circumstances and attitudes.  It should be noted that this does not preclude the choice of
an immediate annuity as the market for annuities is fairly well developed.
Within this system there is the possibility of individuals taking the proceeds of their
pensions arrangements as a lump sum and rapidly spending the money.  Generally this
would not cause a problem for the State as most individuals who would have been in a
position to amass substantial private pension funds would also be entitled to a non means




B.2.1.1 The State system
Australia operates an Age Pension funded through general revenues at age 65 (61 for
women but this is being raised progressively to 65).  The pension is means tested and not
universal.  Australia has never operated an earnings related pension system. The Age
Pension pays 25% of average male workers’ weekly earnings and is adjusted twice per
year.
B.2.1.2 Employer plans
In 1992, the government mandated employers to make contributions to pension (or
superannuation) schemes.  Currently the contribution rate is 7% (and being increased in
steps to 9% by 2002) of employee earnings.  The amounts are fully vested and fully
portable. The schemes are compulsory, except for lower paid employees who can opt out
of the scheme and receive higher wages.
The employer offers the employee a choice of funds.  Investments are not controlled by
the employee. The large majority of schemes are defined contribution. The
superannuation funds are taxed.  All contributions, earnings (unless tax has been paid by
the dividend issuer) and capital growth is taxed.
Withdrawal can occur after reaching age 55 (moving to 60 by 2025).  The withdrawal
may be by lumps sum or by annuity.  There are no stipulated limits.  An individual can
take the money out all at once and spend it before age 65 and be eligible for the means
tested Age Pension, a practice known as ‘double dipping’.  The minimum age for
withdrawals is being increased to 60 is to reduce the scope for double dipping.  Annuity
income and lump sum withdrawals are taxed above a threshold amount.
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B.2.2 Role of annuities in the Australian pension system
The market for ‘for life’ annuities in Australia is small at the moment.  Only 2% of
retirees were receiving income from annuities in the 1992-93 fiscal year.  Most annuity
sales are fixed term and only 16% of annuity sales in 1997 were ‘life long’.
A more popular alternative to annuities is what is known as ‘allocated pensions’ which
somewhat resemble an income drawdown product in the UK.  Assets typically can be
invested in a wide variety of funds and are then used up over time according to the
remaining life expectancy of the drawer.  The maximum withdrawal rate is that which
will exhaust the account by age 80, after which the Age Pension is available.  They are
more flexible than annuities because the individual can vary the withdrawal rate if he/she
wishes.  The schemes do not protect against the risk of outliving the assets.  If an
individual does outlive them, they are still eligible for the means tested Age Pension.
In summary, there is no State compulsion to purchase annuities in Australia.  Individuals
have considerable freedom over how to use their retirement funds.  Although a reasonable
range of annuity products exists, annuities are not generally a popular choice.  The
Australian system does, however, face considerable difficulties caused by people
exhausting their retirement funds and then falling back on the State and the government is
taking action to address this problem.
B.3  Ireland43
B.3.1 Background
B.3.1.1 The State system
Ireland operates a universal scheme without means testing.  Pensions are payable from
age 66.  The State pension is currently equal to 29% of average industrial earnings.
B.3.1.2 Occupational schemes
In 1995, 52% of employees are covered by occupational schemes, but 75% of schemes do
not allow part-timers to join. There is a growing trend towards defined contribution
schemes, but currently only about 10% of schemes are defined contribution. Many
schemes have vesting periods of five years, the present statutory maximum.
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B.3.1.3 Personal pensions
Only 27% (1995) of the self employed have personal pension plans.
Proposals are underway for a ‘Personal Retirement Savings Account’ (PRSA).  This
would be available to all individuals irrespective of employment status and would be fully
portable.  A deferral option would be permitted allowing for the investor to enter into a
drawdown arrangement, and thus postponing the decision to buy a life annuity.  However,
annuities must be purchased by age 75 at the latest.
Up to 25% of accumulated PRSA funds (up to a maximum of £25,000) can be used as
collateral for taking out loans, analogous to 401(k) plans in the USA.
B.3.2 Role of annuities in the Irish pension system
Until recently, defined contribution scheme members and the self-employed had to
purchase an annuity contract immediately on retirement: up to 25% could be taken as a
lump sum.  But annuities came to be perceived as poor value as long term interest rates
declined.
The annuity market in Ireland is characterised by lack of competition and a narrow range
of products.  Only one company offers a with-profits annuity. Index-linked annuities are
not available as no index-linked bonds have been issued by the Irish government.
The Irish Pensions Board has proposed that pension scheme members be able to defer the
purchase of annuity until age 75.  For example, an individual could buy an interim term
annuity which gives taxable income for 5 years, plus the return of capital at the end.  The
capital then has to be used to purchase a ‘for-life’ annuity (or another temporary annuity
if the individual is less than 75).
The 1999 Finance Act introduced elements of these proposals but only for the self-
employed and owner directors.  The retirement options are:
1.  Take up to 25% of the value of the fund as a lump sum and also purchase an annuity.
2.  Take the 25% lump sum and invest the rest in an Approved Retirement Fund (ARF).
Unless an individual has other income of at least IR£10,000pa (or is already 75), he/she
must deposit IR£50,000 (or the total if less) of his/her fund in an Approved Minimum
Retirement Fund (AMRF) or purchase an annuity at once. ARFs and AMRFs can consist
of deposits, life funds, unit trusts, individual shares or property.  Monies in an ARF can
be withdrawn at any time.  Drawdown withdrawals are taxed at the marginal rate of
income tax. Monies placed in an ARMF may not be withdrawn until age 75.
63
3. Take the 25% lump sum and 75% the balance as a taxable cash payment.  However,
again, if the investor does not have an income of at least IR£10,000 he/she must put
IR£50,000 in an AMRF or an annuity.
In summary, the Irish system has changed from a system, similar to that in the UK, in
which the self-employed were compelled to purchase an annuity on retirement.  This
compulsion to purchase annuities has been removed allowing individuals some discretion
over how to deal with the proceeds of their pension funds.  The new system has
introduced measures to ensure that individuals without sufficient alternative income
cannot exhaust their funds too quickly.
B.4  Chile44
B.4.1 Background
B.4.1.1 Replacement of a State system by a private system
In 1981, Chile replaced a State pay-as-you-go system with a private system based on
individual accounts. Workers must save in personal retirement accounts and contribute to
disability and survivor insurance.  The responsibility is the employee’s.  In a one-off step,
what used to be the employer’s contribution is transferred to the employee as income so
the employee could, in turn, save it in his/her pension scheme.
The system is mandatory for all new joiners to the workforce and voluntary for existing
workers. To recognise the fact that existing workers had previously paid into the State
system to date, they were given ‘recognition bonds’ which the Government will honour
within their personal retirement accounts when they retire.
Contributions equal 10% of wages.  All contributions are tax deductible. They are
voluntary for the self-employed. Contributions are invested with a private pension firm.
Individuals may switch firm every 4 months.  The firm must arrange disability and
survivor cover.  Investments can be in bank deposits, government securities, equity,
corporate bonds, or real estate.  Each investment type within the portfolio is subject to
percentage limits of the whole.
The credited return on the fund is prohibited from diverging by more than 2 percentage
points from the average return for all funds.  Excesses are placed in a ‘profitability
reserve’ portfolio and credited back into the fund during lean years.
Withdrawals at retirement take the following forms: the individual may either buy a life
annuity or make periodic drawdowns on the basis of a defined schedule acceptable to the
64
government, based on life expectancy and interest rates.  Income is taxable. Individuals
can take a lump sum only if the account balance is greater than required to buy a pension
of 70% of average salary and at least 120% of the Minimum Pension.
If individuals have been members of a scheme for 20 years and still have insufficient
funds, the government will top-up their scheme to enable them to buy a Minimum
Pension.  The Minimum Pension is now 25% of average income (about 75% of the
minimum wage).
B.4.2 Role of annuities in the Chilean pensions system
Annuities sold in Chile must be index linked and provide survivor benefits. Retirees are
free to choose an annuity in the open market. Annuity providers may not act as individual
pension account providers.  Providers are regulated and the government has an annuity
guarantee scheme if annuity providers default.
In summary, in the Chilean pension system there is no State compulsion to purchase
annuities.  Individuals may take a lump sum withdrawal from their accumulated pension
funds after securing an appropriate pension.  This pension may be secured by means of an
annuity or by making periodic drawdowns on a schedule acceptable to the government.
B.5 Singapore45
B.5.1 Background
Unlike most other countries that finance their social security systems on a pay-as-you-go
basis, Singapore requires its working citizens to save for their own retirement through a
mandatory publicly managed savings programme known as the Central Provident Fund
(CPF).
Most employed Singaporean citizens are required to be members of the CPF.  Fund
accounts belong to individual members and are portable, remaining with the employee
through job changes and forming part of the account holder’s estate on death.
Both employees and employers make monthly contributions to the fund.  The total
contribution rate for workers up to the age of 55 is 30%, 20% from the employee and
10% from the employer.  Until recently, total contribution levels were 40% split equally
between employee and employer, but, due to the recent economic turmoil in Asia, the
employer’s contribution level has been reduced to 10% for a period of two years.
CPF contributions are only levied on salaries up to a ceiling of S$6,000 per month.
Contribution levels vary from zero, for low paid employees (those earning up to S$200
per month) up to the full 20% employee contribution rate for employees earning over
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S$363 per month.  In order to encourage employees to work for as long as possible,
contribution levels are reduced for those over 55.
CPF contributions are credited to three accounts:
1.  Ordinary account: can be used for retirement, buying a home, insurance, investment
and education.
2.   Medisave account: can be used to pay hospital bills and approved medical insurance.
3.   Special account: reserved for old age and contingencies.
Contributions to the CPF earn market-related interest rates based on the 12-month fixed
deposit and month-end savings rates of four major local banks.  Since 1986, members of
the CPF have been able to invest a proportion of their accumulated funds into equities
and other approved investments in order to maximise investment returns.
Deposits and withdrawals from the fund are tax-exempt as are gains within the fund.
B.5.2 Role of annuities in the Singaporean pension system
Members can withdraw their CPF savings when they reach 55, after setting aside a
minimum sum in their Retirement Account for old age.  As at 1 July 1999, this was set at
S$60,000 but it is gradually being increased to S$80,000 by 2003.  Couples need only set
aside 1.5 times the minimum sum, providing each is named beneficiary on death.
In practice, two thirds of CPF members reaching age 55 have accounts exceeding the
minimum sum and most participants withdraw the excess funds to invest in higher
yielding investments.
The minimum sum can be used in three ways:
1.   To buy a life annuity from an approved insurance company.
2.   It can be deposited with an approved bank.
3.   It can be kept in a Retirement Account with the CPF from which an income would be
received.
Income payments from the above options begin at 60 and only the option of the life
annuity guarantees income for life.  Payments from approved banks or the CPF board
only continue until the minimum sum is used up.
Individuals are expected to make proper use of any surplus funds withdrawn from their
CPF account in order to provide for a comfortable retirement.  In this way, they remove
the financial burdens of retirement and old age from the State.
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In summary, there is no State compulsion to purchase an annuity. Individuals may take
withdrawals from their CPF savings after setting aside a minimum sum.  Purchasing an
annuity is one of three options for investing the minimum sum.
B.6  Continental Europe
B.6.1 Background
In general terms most countries in continental Europe provide generous State pensions.
Except for Holland and Switzerland and to a lesser extent the Scandinavian countries,
funded private pension plans did not begin in the Continental countries until the late
1990s.
Individuals do have the discretion to augment their retirement income by purchasing
annuities.  There is generally a reasonably active market in annuities, despite the fact that
private funded pension plans are a recent phenomenon.  Annuities in continental Europe
are designed using methods quite unlike those used in the UK as discussed below.
B.6.2 Annuities in Continental Europe46
Annuities in many Continental European countries are priced on a ‘technical rate’ basis, a
legacy of the old tariff-based insurance system where prior approval of premiums was
required from the supervisory authority.  The annuity price is calculated using a discount
rate equal to the technical interest rate.  The initial annuity payment is revalued in
subsequent years by an amount equal to the excess of the insurer’s actual declared rate of
return obtained on its general fund (less expenses) over the technical rate.  The annuities
are therefore effectively ‘with profits’.
The maximum interest rate is set by legislation, and is effectively the rate of return which
is guaranteed in advance by the insurer.  In other words, if the actual declared rate of
return less expenses is equal to the technical rate, the annuity payment remains the same
from one year to the next; and if it is less than the technical rate, the annuity payment is
not reduced and the strain is borne by the insurer.
The underlying investments are generally bonds, so the returns are stable if unexciting.
The gross returns declared are typically the insurer’s general with-profits bonus rates
(with-profits policies are generally more prevalent than in the UK), so the rate at which
the annuity payments are revalued is the difference between the with-profits bonus rate
and the technical interest rate.  Within the EU, the Third Life Insurance Directive calls for
a maximum guaranteed (i.e. technical) interest rate equal to 60% of the long bond yield,
allowing a safety margin so that annuities will be able to be revalued (upwards) each year.
The interpretation of this directive into local legislation, and the circumstances in which
exemptions are allowed, vary from country to country.  Such a safety margin has not
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existed in recent years in countries such as Japan where insurers have been unable to
obtain the investment returns to cover their interest rate guarantees.
It is therefore not possible to buy fixed rate (non-increasing) annuities in these markets;
prospective purchasers accept that their annuities will be revalued in some way  (and are
generally astonished to learn that this often does not happen in the UK).  Comparison of
annuities at point of purchase is difficult:  purchase prices are all very similar (differences
mainly being due to expenses), but the products are not all the same unlike in the UK:
after, say, 5 years, an annuity of 1000 euros per year bought from insurance company A
will have been revalued to a different amount than an annuity of 1000 euros per year
bought from insurance company B.
Also, index-linked annuities are not sold, as index-linked bonds to back the annuities are
not issued (except for a small recent issue in France).
Prices of annuities do not generally change every year as they do in the UK.  Instead,
there are ‘step changes’ when the technical interest rate changes (e.g. from 4.75% to
3.25% as recently happened in Belgium, or 4.5% to 3.5% as happened several years ago
in France).
The other factor affecting the price of annuities is mortality.  In these markets, another
legacy of the old tariff-based insurance pricing system is that insurance companies in each
market use the same mortality table.  When this is changed (as in 1998 in Germany, or
several years ago in France) there is a ‘step change’ in the price of the annuity.
Appendix C – Decomposition of Annuity Loads.
It is possible to decompose the loads (or charges) on annuities extracted by life companies
into the following components using estimates derived by Finkelstein and Poterba (1999,
hereafter FP): a component arising from the selection risk associated with the type of
people who purchase annuities, a component arising from the additional risk associated
with the type of people who purchase annuities in the voluntary market, a component
arising from escalation risk, and a component that covers administration costs and profit
to the insurance company.  It is also possible to identify a size effect, an age effect and a
sex effect.
The basis for FP’s analysis is the money’s worth of an annuity which is defined as the
ratio of the expected present value (EPV) to the premium, where the EPV is defined as:
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A = nominal initial annuity payment
π= escalation factor (zero for level annuity)
rk = nominal spot yield for year k derived from the government bond spot yield curve
T = maximum length of pension based on the assumption that no one lives beyond age
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St = probability that the annuitant survives t years.
FP derive estimates of  (C.1) based on three different sets of single-life mortality tables:
the population mortality tables provided by the Government Actuary’s Department, and
the mortality tables for voluntary and compulsory annuitants provided by the Institute of
Actuaries’ Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau.  The latter two sets of tables are
the IM80 and IF80 tables for voluntary purchase male and female life annuities and  the
PM92 and  PF92 tables for the compulsory purchase male and female life annuities that
must be bought when someone retires from a personal pension scheme.  These tables are
based on the mortality experience of these two select groups around 1980 and 1992
respectively, and have been adjusted to account for mortality improvements since that
period.
If an annuity is fairly priced, its money’s worth would be 100%.  In practice though it will
be less than this because of the charge components outlined above.  FP use data provided
by Annuity Direct and Moneyfacts for August and November 1998, respectively: they
analyse the money’s worth of an immediate single life annuity with monthly payments
and a premium of £10,000. Their decomposition is presented in Table C.1.
Take for example the case of a 65-year old male and a level annuity.  This pays £879.70
in the compulsory purchase market and £844.40 in the voluntary open market, the
difference reflecting the greater life expectancy of those who purchase annuities on a
voluntary basis over those who are required to do so as part of their pension scheme (we
denote this component of charges the volunteer premium).  The total implied charge is
10.3% of the purchase price in the compulsory market and 13.5% in the voluntary market.
This is found as follows: calculate (C.1) using the population mortality table with  A =
£879.70 for the compulsory annuity and £844.40 for the voluntary annuity, divide this by
the purchase price (£10,000) to give the money’s worth, which is then subtracted from
100%.  Using population mortality to calculate (C.1) is equivalent to assuming the
longevity experience of a typical member of the population as a whole.
If, using population mortality, the money’s worth is below 100%, this implies that there
are additional longevity risks associated with the select group of the population who
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purchase annuities; we must also make an allowance for the insurance company’s
administration costs and profit. We quantify these additional risks and costs as follows.
The selection premium covers the additional longevity risk of someone who purchases an
annuity in comparison with a typical member of the population at large of the same sex
and age.  The selection premium associated with compulsory annuities is 4.7%: it is
measured as the difference in money’s worths calculated using (C.1) based on
compulsory mortality tables and (C.1) based on population mortality tables.  So even
though members of personal pension schemes have no choice about whether or not to buy
an annuity, they as a group experience sufficiently lighter mortality than the population as
a whole that insurance companies need to charge 65-year old men a premium of 4.7% to
cover this additional risk.  The selection premium with voluntary annuities is, at 4.6%, of
a similar order of magnitude.
Since those who buy annuities voluntarily experience even lighter mortality than personal
pension scheme members, insurance companies charge such purchasers an additional
volunteer premium. This is calculated as the difference between the money’s worth in the
voluntary market using the voluntary mortality table and the money’s worth in the
voluntary market using the compulsory mortality table. For a 65-year old male, the
volunteer premium is 4.2%.
The table also reports evidence of a size effect in annuity provision and two
countervailing influences are apparent.  The first is a scale effect: the cost of
administering an annuity is independent of its size, so that insurance companies should be
willing to pass scale economies onto high-valued policy holders. The table shows that this
happens, although evidence is only available on compulsory level annuities: the charge is
1.3 percentage points lower for a 65-year old man when the purchase price is £50,000
than when it is £10,000.  The second effect is a wealth effect: richer people tend to live
longer than poorer people, and this should be reflected in a higher longevity premium.
This effect begins to dominate the scale effect on annuities over £50,000: there is a small
increase in charges of  0.2 percentage points as the policy size rises from £50,000 to
£100,000.
We can assess the importance of the age effect by comparing these results with those
relating to a male aged 70.  There are two factors to consider: an older man has on
average fewer remaining years than a younger man, but, because he has survived to a
greater age than the younger man and so has greater total life expectancy, the difference
in remaining years will be greater than their age difference.  The first factor will result in
a higher annuity for the older man than for the younger man, but this will be partly
counteracted by the second factor: the risk that an annuitant will live a very long time
increases with the age at which he purchases the annuity (see, e.g., Brugiavini (1993)).
The second panel of the table shows that a 70-year old man receives an annuity that is
18% higher than that for a 65-year old man in both the compulsory and voluntary level
markets.  However, the total charges for the 70-year old are nearly 3 percentage points
higher in each market.  The selection premium remains the same in both markets, but the
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volunteer premium is 2.4 percentage points higher.  We can interpret the figure of 2.4%
as the age premium and note that, in the case of 65 year old men, the age premium is
present only in the voluntary market, not the compulsory market.  A size effect is also
present, although the orders of magnitude differ slightly in comparison with the 65-year
old male.
The final effect that we can identify is a sex effect: women tend to live longer than men
and this is reflected  in the size of the annuity they are offered for a given premium. A 65-
year old women receives a level annuity that is 13-14% lower than that of a 65-year old
man, while a 70-year old woman receives broadly the same annuity as a 65-year old man.
The level and pattern of charges differs however.  The total charge for men is generally
higher than for women in the compulsory market, but lower in the voluntary market.
Both the selection and  volunteer premiums are lower for women than for men. There is a
positive age premium in the voluntary market, but at 1.2% it is only half that for men,
while in the compulsory market, the age premium is negative (-0.1%): the age premium is
the difference between the sums of the volunteer, selection and escalation premia at age
70 and 65 years respectively.  The wealth component of the size effect is larger for
women than for men (0.5 compared with 0.2 at age 65 and 0.6 compared with 0.3 at age
70).
The initial annuity payment with a 5% escalating annuity is 37% lower than for a level
annuity for a 65-year old man in the compulsory market and 38% lower in the voluntary
market.  It takes 10 years for the escalating annuity to catch up with the level annuity and
19 years before the total cash payments under the two policies are equalised.  In the case
of a 65-year old woman, the initial payment from the escalating annuity is 42% lower for
both the compulsory and voluntary markets. It takes around 12 years for the two cash
amounts to equalise and a further 10 years before the total cash payments equalise.
The total implied charge is higher for escalating annuities than for level annuities. This is
because both the volunteer and selection premia are higher and there is an additional
escalation premium to take into account.  The escalation premium covers a type of
longevity risk that arises from the backloading of payments with escalating  annuities: if
the annuitant lives longer than anticipated, the additional payments will be rising with the
escalating annuity but remain constant with the level annuity.  It is calculated as the
difference between the money’s worths of the level and escalating annuities, each
evaluated using own-market mortality tables. The escalation premium varies between 1.6
and 2.6% for men and between 3.1 and 3.5% for women.
To illustrate in the case of a 65-year old man, the volunteer premium is 6.5% with the
escalating annuity and 4.2% with the level annuity.  The selection premium is 6.4%
compared with 4.7% in the compulsory market and  6.1% compared with 4.6% in the
voluntary market.  In comparison, with a 65-year old woman, the volunteer premium is
4.7% with the escalating annuity and 3.2% with the level annuity.  The selection premium
is 3.0% compared with 1.9% in the compulsory market and 2.9% compared with 1.9% in
the voluntary market.  The age premium is smaller for both men and women in the
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compulsory market (at 0.1% and 0.2% respectively) than in the voluntary market (at 1.4%
and 0.9% respectively).
The allowance for administration costs and profit is calculated as the difference between
the total implied charge and the sum of the volunteer, escalation and selection premia.  In
the level market, this is also equal to the difference between an actuarially fair annuity
and the money’s worth of an annuity using the own-market mortality table (e.g., 100 -
94.4 for the compulsory level annuity for a 65-year old male).  With escalating annuities,
the escalation premium must be subtracted from this figure. The consequence of
calculating the administration costs and profit in this way is that the profit margin
(assuming identical administration costs across products) is the same in the level and
escalating markets for each class of product (compulsory or voluntary) and for each class
of annuitant. An alternative definition of administration costs and profit in the case of
escalating annuities would be the same as that for level annuities: the difference between
an actuarially fair annuity and the money’s worth of an annuity using the own-market
mortality table.  The profit margin would be higher than with the first definition, but
would also now contain an allowance for escalation risk.
Apart from this, we find that: compulsory annuities are generally more profitable than
voluntary annuities, reflecting the fact that the compulsory market is a captive one, that
female annuities are more profitable than male annuities and that the profit margin rises
with age, especially in the compulsory market.
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Table C.1   Decomposition of Loads on Annuities with £10,000 Purchase Price
Level Escalating at 5%
Compulsory Voluntary Compulsory Voluntary
Male aged 65
Initial annuity payment (£) 879.70 844.40 550.20 522.90
Total implied charge (%)a 10.3 13.5 14.2 19.6
        composed of:
Volunteer premium (%)b - 4.2 - 6.5
Escalation  premium (%)c - - 2.2 2.3
Selection premium (%)d 4.7 4.6 6.4 6.1
Administration cost and profite 5.6 4.7 5.6 4.7
Size premiumg:
     £10,000 to £50,000 -1.3 NA NA NA
     £50,000 to £100,000 0.2 NA NA NA
Male aged 70
Initial annuity payment (£) 1036.10 992.80 703.70 670.40
Total implied charge (%)a 13.1 16.3 17.1 21.4
       composed of:
Volunteer premium (%)b - 6.6 - 8.9
Escalation  premium (%)c - - 2.6 1.6
Selection premium (%)d 4.7 4.6 6.1 5.8
Administration cost and profite 8.4 5.1 8.4 5.1
Age premiumf 0.0 2.4 0.1 1.4
Size premiumg:
     £10,000 to £50,000 -0.6 NA NA NA
     £50,000 to £100,000 0.3 NA NA NA
Female aged 65
Initial annuity payment (£) 768.50 727.60 445.4 420.3
Total implied charge (%)a 9.9 14.7 14.1 20.7
       composed of:
Volunteer premium (%)b - 3.2 - 4.7
Escalation  premium (%)c - - 3.1 3.5
Selection premium (%)d 1.9 1.9 3.0 2.9
Administration cost and profite 8.0 9.6 8.0 9.6
Size premiumg:
     £10,000 to £50,000 -1.4 NA NA NA
     £50,000 to £100,000 0.5 NA NA NA
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Female aged 70
Initial annuity payment (£A) 885.20 843.50 560.80 532.10
Total implied charge (%)a 12.7 16.7 17.2 22.4
        composed of:
Volunteer premium (%)b - 4.5 - 5.9
Escalation  premium (%)c - - 3.4 3.4
Selection premium (%)d 1.8 1.8 2.9 2.7
Administration cost and profite 10.9 10.4 10.9 10.4
Age premiumf -0.1 1.2 0.2 0.9
Size premiumg:
     £10,000 to £50,000 -1.0 NA NA NA
     £50,000 to £100,000 0.6 NA NA NA
Source: Calculations based on the averages from a sample of 9 insurance companies
reported in Tables 2, 7 and 12 of  Finkelstein and Poterba (1999).
Notes:
a The difference between an actuarially fair annuity (100%) and the money’s worth of the
annuity using  the population mortality table (e.g., 100 – 89.7 for the level compulsory
annuity for a 65-year old male).
b For voluntary annuities only, the difference between the money’s worth of the annuity
using the voluntary mortality table and the money’s worth using the compulsory mortality
table (e.g., 95.3 – 91.1 for the level voluntary annuity for a 65-year old male).
c For escalating annuities only, the difference between the money’s worths of the level
and escalating annuities, both evaluated using the own-market mortality table (e.g., 94.2 –
92.2 for the compulsory annuity for a 65-year old male).
d The difference between the money’s worth of the annuity using the own-market
mortality table and the money’s worth using the population mortality table (e.g., 94.4 -
89.7 for the level compulsory annuity for a 65-year old male).
e The difference between the total implied charge and the sum of the volunteer, escalation
and selection premia.
f The difference between the sums of the volunteer, escalation and selection premia at age
70 and 65.
g The difference in money’s worth between the lower and higher valued annuities, both
evaluated using population mortality tables (e.g., 89.7 – 91.0 for the £10,000 and £50,000
annuities for a 65-year old male).
74
Appendix D - Mortality Drag
The size of an annuity depends on the following factors: the return on the assets
purchased with the capital sum (principally government bonds), life office expenses, the
degree of escalation, the benefits payable on death and the assumption made about the
mortality experience of annuitants, both concerning the average life expectancy of
annuitants and the anticipated distribution of life expectancies (ie, the proportion of
annuitants expected to die after one year, after two years, etc.).  If the assumptions made
about these factors are realised in full, the insurance company will have exactly enough
resources to meet every annuity payment due.  On the death of an annuitant, the balance
of the original capital fund, together with investment returns (collectively called the
‘mortality profits’), is used to make payments to surviving annuitants.  Each annuity
instalment has three components: a proportion of the original purchase price, a proportion
of the investment return, and a proportion of the assumed mortality profit released by the
early deaths of annuitants.
In contrast, with drawdown, there is no mortality cross-subsidy from those with below-
average mortality to those with above-average mortality: every user of a drawdown
facility bears his or her own longevity risk.  The absence of the mortality cross-subsidy is
known as ‘mortality drag’.  For drawdown to be worthwhile, the returns on the invested
funds must exceed the annuity yield by a sufficient margin to cover both the mortality
drag and the higher charges of drawdown. The mortality drag will be higher for older than
for younger people: older people are more likely to die than younger people and also there
will be fewer of them, so that the cross-subsidy will be larger and received sooner than
for younger people.  It will also be higher for men than for women for a similar reason:
men tend to die younger than women and relatively there are fewer of them at each given
age.  However, the benefit of drawdown is its greater flexibility over the timing of the
purchase of the annuity and the higher value of the fund if the annuitant dies early.
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Example of additional return needed to cover mortality drag and  drawdown charges47
Male retiring between 60 and 74, assuming an  initial drawdown charge of 3%, an
annual charge of 0.5%, an annuity yield of 7.5% and an annuity purchased at  age 75
Age at retirement Mortality drag (%) Charges (%) Additional total
return required (%)
60 1.4 1.8 3.2
61 1.5 1.8 3.3
62 1.6 1.8 3.4
63 1.7 1.9 3.6
64 1.9 1.9 3.8
65 2.0 2.0 4.0
66 2.3 2.0 4.3
67 2.5 2.1 4.6
68 2.8 2.2 5.0
69 3.2 2.3 5.5
70 3.5 2.5 6.0
71 3.6 3.0 6.6
72 3.7 3.5 7.2
73 3.9 4.6 8.5
74 4.1 8.4 12.5
If the man retires aged 60, and makes use of the drawdown facility until age 75, when he
purchases an annuity, he will require an additional return on his investments of 1.8% pa
to compensate for the higher charges of drawdown and 1.4% pa to compensate for
mortality drag. Given that the annuity yield is assumed to be 7.5% pa, this implies that
the total return on investments must exceed an average of 10.7% pa between ages 60 and
75 for the benefits of drawdown to exceed those of purchasing the annuity.  If this return
is not achieved, either the fund will be depleted more rapidly than anticipated or the
income withdrawn would have to be lower than that available from the purchase of an
annuity at age 60.  The additional total return required increases with age of retirement.
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Appendix E - The Effect of Inflation on Annuities
We often hear people say, because annuity rates have fallen dramatically since 1990 to
their lowest rate for 30 years, that annuities are now very poor value for money. But is
this really the case? The answer depends on the accuracy of the market’s forecasts of
future inflation embodied in the long-term nominal yields on government bonds and
therefore in the quoted rates for level annuities. If inflation is fully anticipated, then
quoted level annuity rates will fall if the inflation rate in the future is expected to fall, but
there will be no reduction in the real value of the annuity compared with that offered
when the inflation rate was expected to be higher.  Those who believe that the real value
of an annuity must have fallen just because the quoted annuity rate has fallen are suffering
what is known as ‘money illusion’.  Certainly it is true that the real value of the payments
on level annuities sold at the beginning of the 1990s was higher than the real value of the
payments on level annuities sold at the beginning of the 2000s (and costing the same), but
that is because there has been an unexpected fall in the inflation rate over the period
which has benefited those who purchased level annuities at the beginning of the 1990s.
But even if inflation is fully anticipated, the level of inflation will influence the timing of
the real payments made by the annuity. The higher the level of inflation, the earlier in
time that the real payments on a level annuity are received: this is known as the ‘front-
loading’ of inflation. This appendix examines these issues in more detail.
E.1  Fully anticipated inflation
E.1.1 Money illusion
The nominal interest rate is related to the real interest rate and the expected inflation rate
through a relationship known as the Fisher equation (see Blake (2000, chapter 2)):
where:
r         Nominal interest rate
ρ        Real interest rate
πe       Expected inflation rate.
If the inflation rate is fully anticipated then the actual inflation rate (π ) will equal the
expected inflation rate (πe ).
Let us consider an index-linked annuity in which the initial annual payment (dr) is
uprated annually by the actual rate of inflation in order to preserve its real value.  Suppose
( . ) ( ) ( )( )E r e1 1 1 1+ = + +ρ π
77
that the annuitant will live for T years.  The purchase price of this annuity is given by the
present value of the future cash payments (see Blake (2000, chapter 3)):
Because inflation is fully anticipated, the terms in π  and πe  cancel out and the value of
the annuity depends only on the real discount rate ( ρ ) (apart from the duration term (T)
and the level of the annual payment (dr)).  The real value of the annuity will fall if the real
annuity rate falls but not if the nominal annuity rate falls, so long as inflation is fully
anticipated. Equivalently, we would expect to see the nominal annuity rate fall if the
expected inflation rate falls, but if inflationary expectations are realised in full, then this
will not reduce the real value of the annuity.  In this case there will be no money illusion.
E.1.2  Front-loading of inflation
However, the nominal value of the annuity payment does depend on the nominal interest
rate and therefore on the rate of inflation.  Consider now a level annuity paying  a fixed
amount d per year for T years. The purchase price of this annuity is given by:
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Table E.1 illustrates this result.  Suppose that the real rate of interest is constant at 3%.  A
purchase price of £100,000 will buy an index-linked annuity with an initial annual
payment of £6722 which is found by rearranging equation (E.2):
In practice, the initial annual annuity amount will be less than £6722  to allow for
administration costs, insurance company profit and the possibility that the annuitant lives
longer than 20 years.  The initial sum will be uprated by the realised annual rate of
inflation in order to maintain a constant real value of £6722 (in starting year prices) for
the full term of the annuity: this is shown in the second column of Table E.1.
If instead the individual buys a level annuity, and inflation is expected to be 2% then the
nominal return will be 5.06% (from the Fisher equation).  Using equation (E.4), this
implies a level annuity of £8065 per annum for 20 years. The real value of the annuity
will fall by 2% per annum and after 20 years, the real value will have fallen to £5536 as
shown in the third column of the table. The fourth and fifth columns of the table show
that as the expected inflation rate, and hence the nominal interest rate, rises (even though
the real rate is unchanged at 3%), the initial annuity payment also rises: with expected
inflation at 10%, the first year payment is £14,493, which is 80% higher than the initial
payment when the expected inflation rate is 2%. But the real value of the annual
payments also fall more rapidly the higher the inflation rate. With expected inflation at
10%, the real terminal value of the annuity is £2370, which is 57% lower than real
terminal value when the expected inflation rate is just 2%. Fig. E.1 presents the same
information in graphical form.
The table and graph clearly show the front-loading effects of inflation: the higher the
level of expected inflation, the more the real value of the annuity payments are
concentrated at the beginning of the period.
E.2  Unanticipated inflation
Table E.1 and Fig. E.1 show that the distribution over time of the real value of the
payments on an annuity depends on the inflation rate.  But so long as inflation is fully
anticipated, the total value of each of the four annuities considered is identical.  Each has










Table E.1  Real value of annual payments on indexed and level annuities at different




Real interest rate 3% 3% 3% 3%
Expected
inflation
- 2% 5% 10%
Nominal interest
rate
- 5.06% 8.15% 13.30%
Year
1 6722 8065 10299 14493
2 6722 7907 9809 13175
3 6722 7752 9342 11977
4 6722 7600 8897 10889
5 6722 7451 8473 9899
6 6722 7305 8070 8999
7 6722 7162 7685 8181
8 6722 7021 7319 7437
9 6722 6884 6971 6761
10 6722 6749 6639 6146
11 6722 6616 6323 5588
12 6722 6486 6022 5080
13 6722 6359 5735 4618
14 6722 6235 5462 4198
15 6722 6112 5202 3816
16 6722 5993 4954 3469
17 6722 5875 4718 3154
18 6722 5760 4493 2867
19 6722 5647 4280 2607
20 6722 5536 4076 2370
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However, the outcome is different if actual inflation differs from that which was
anticipated when the annuity was purchased, as Table E.2 shows.  Consider again the
indexed annuity and the level annuity each having a purchase price of £100,000 when the
expected inflation rate is 5%. The indexed annuity makes a year 1 payment of £6722
(column 2), while the level annuity makes a year 1 payment of  £10,299 (column 4).
Suppose that immediately after the annuity is purchased, the inflation rate falls to 2% and
remains at this level for 20 years.  The table shows that this unanticipated change has no
effect on the real value of the payments with an indexed annuity (column 2).  But it
dramatically raises the real value of the payments from the level annuity (column 3): the
real value of the final payment exceeds that of the indexed annuity. So an unanticipated
fall in inflation makes the level annuity a better deal than the real annuity.
The opposite conclusion holds if there is an unanticipated increase in the inflation rate.
Suppose that immediately after the annuity is purchased, the inflation rate rises to 10%
and remains at this level for 20 years.  The table shows that this unanticipated change
dramatically reduces the real value of the payments from the level annuity (column 5): the
real value of the payments falls below that of the indexed annuity after just 6 years. So an
unanticipated rise in inflation makes the level annuity a worse deal than the real annuity.
Fig. 2  presents these results in graphical form.
So inflation has the following effects on annuities.  If it is fully anticipated, the total real
value of the annuity payments will be independent of the level of inflation (no money
illusion), although the real value will more heavily concentrated at the beginning of the
period the higher the level of inflation (front-loading).  If inflation is higher than
anticipated, then level annuities will turn out to be poor value for money compared with
indexed annuities, while the opposite is true if inflation is lower than anticipated.
Individuals who buy level annuities are taking out a bet on whether inflation will be
higher or lower than that implied by the payments from an indexed annuity with the same
purchase price.
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Table E.2  Real value of annual payments on indexed and level annuity at different





Real interest rate 3% 3% 3% 3%
Actual inflation - 2% 5% 10%
Nominal interest
rate
- 5.06% 8.15% 13.30%
Year
1 6722 10299 10299 10299
2 6722 10097 9809 9363
3 6722 9899 9342 8512
4 6722 9705 8897 7738
5 6722 9515 8473 7034
6 6722 9328 8070 6395
7 6722 9145 7685 5814
8 6722 8966 7319 5285
9 6722 8790 6971 4805
10 6722 8618 6639 4368
11 6722 8449 6323 3971
12 6722 8283 6022 3610
13 6722 8121 5735 3282
14 6722 7962 5462 2983
15 6722 7805 5202 2712
16 6722 7652 4954 2466
17 6722 7502 4718 2241
18 6722 7355 4493 2038
19 6722 7211 4280 1852
20 6722 7070 4076 1684
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Appendix F - Proportion of Pensioners likely to be affected by the
Recommendations
Market research can be used to estimate the proportion of pensioners who might be
affected by the recommendations of this Report.  The Working Party has been given
access to the Aberdeen Asset Management Retirement Income Survey.  The sample
design of this survey aims to accurately reflect the GB population in terms of region and
informant demographics.
In principle, the people who will be affected by the Working Party’s proposals are those
who will have an income from pensions (i.e. not including other sources of income such
as investment income) greater than the MRI, part of which has been obtained from an
annuity based product.  Information on this group of individuals can be obtained from
surveys of existing pensioners and of people who have yet to retire.
F.1 Existing Pensioners
The Aberdeen Asset Management Retirement Income Survey for November 1999
identifies retired individuals obtaining a pension from an annuity-based product by the
size of their total pension.  This information is summarised in Table F.1 below.










pension in this band as a
percentage of all
pensioners (%)
Up to 200 13.8 3.7
201 to 300 15.4 4.1
391 to 400 21.5 5.8
401 to 500 21.5 5.8
501 to 750 12.3 3.3
751 to 1000 10.8 2.9
1001 to 1500 4.6 1.2
1501 to 2000 0.0 0.0
Over 2000 0.0 0.0
Number of pensioners surveyed: 500
Pensioners who refused to answer questions about their income or who did not know
their income have been excluded in calculating the percentages above.
Source: Aberdeen Asset Management Retirement Income Survey
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The proposed MRI is currently about £560 per month (£140 per week). Table F.1 can be
used to determine the percentage of pensioners who have a current pension that exceeds
this figure. There are, however, some pitfalls in interpreting this to be the percentage of
pensioners who will be affected by the recommendations.  Any particular pensioner will
only be affected by the MRI at the date he retires not at some snapshot date in the future.
Both the MRI and pensions in payment tend to increase over time.  Part of the MRI is
related to the Basic State Pension and this will increase in line with RPI.  The remaining
portion will increase in line with earnings.  Pensions in payment may increase at a variety
of different rates, normally at no more than the rate of increase in RPI.  Thus pensions in
payment will tend to increase more slowly than the MRI, since it rises by more than the
RPI.  Thus some pensioners who would have had a pension above MRI at retirement will
eventually find that their pension falls below the MRI after some years of retirement.  It is
difficult to make a precise estimate of the effect of these differential increases.  To give a
rough estimate of the effect one might anticipate that the MRI would perhaps increase by
say between 1% and 3% more per annum that the average pension in payment.  To take
account of this effect, and recognising the bands in which the data is grouped, it is
probably a conservative approximation to consider that all the pensioners currently in the
£501 to £750 per month pension band and above would have had a pension above the
MRI at retirement.
Based on this assumption it can be deduced from column 1 of Table F.1 that 27.7% of
pensioners receiving pensions from annuity-based products (corresponding to 7.4% of all
pensioners (column 2)) would have had a pension above the MRI at retirement.
F.2 Prospective Pensioners
The Aberdeen Asset Management Retirement Income Survey also identifies the  value of
the pension per month that adults aged 45 and over expect to receive when they retire.
This information is summarised in Table F.2 below for individuals expecting pension
from an annuity-based product.
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Table F.2 –  Adults aged 45 and over but not yet retired expecting a pension










pension in this band as a
percentage of all adults
aged 45 and over but not
yet retired
Up to 200 21.3 7.1
201 to 300 19.1 6.4
391 to 400 23.4 7.8
401 to 500 10.6 3.5
501 to 750 10.6 3.5
751 to 1000 8.5 2.8
1001 to 1500 6.4 2.1
1501 to 2000 0.0 0.0
Over 2000 0.0 0.0
Number of individuals surveyed: 444
Individuals who refused to answer questions about their income or who did not know
their income have been excluded in calculating the percentages above.
Source: Aberdeen Asset Management Retirement Income Survey
The percentage of adults aged 45 and over (but not yet retired) who expect to have a
pension that exceeds the proposed MRI can be deduced from Table F.2.  There are some
difficulties in interpreting this to be the percentage of individuals who will exceed MRI at
retirement.  As discussed above, the MRI will increase in future.  When estimating their
expected pension individuals may or may not fully take into account future investment
returns, future contribution increases and future salary and retail price increases.
Distortions may arise from comparing an MRI in current prices with estimates of future
pensions which may not always be made in current terms.  Nonetheless, in the absence of
more detailed information it is perhaps reasonable to assume that individuals expecting a
pension of over £560 per month will have a pension above the MRI at retirement.
Based on this assumption it can be deduced from Table F.2 (with suitable interpolation)
that about 23% of adults aged 45 or over receiving pensions from annuity-based products
(corresponding to 7.6% of all adults aged 45 or over but not yet retired) would expect to
have a pension above the MRI at retirement.
Interestingly, these figures are of the same order of magnitude as for those recently
retired. However, we can reasonably expect that these percentages will be somewhat
higher in the  future as a larger percentage of the population adopt defined contribution
pension arrangements.
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Appendix G – Assumptions used in Determining the Level of Contributions
Required to Provide a Minimum Retirement Income
The following assumptions were used in the projections for Section 6.
G.1 Pension plan membership assumptions
Contributions to start in 2000 when the plan member is 25 years old.
Contributions increase in line with earnings.
Retirement at age 65 in 2040.
No spouse’s pension.
No other pension accrued to date.
Basic State Pension for single person payable from the State at retirement age.
Target benefit of £70 per week, in addition to BSP, in 2000 prices and wages.
Benefit will increase in line with earnings pre-retirement.
Benefit will increase in line with RPI post-retirement.
G.2  Deterministic projections
Increase in retail price index (RPI) 2.5% pa
Pre-retirement investment returns in excess of RPI 4.5% pa
Yield for purchasing annuity at retirement in excess of RPI 3.5% pa
Earnings growth in excess of RPI 1.5% pa
Promotional increases Nil
Career breaks Nil
Pre-retirement expenses 1% pa of the fund
Pre-retirement mortality No assumption needed as
benefit is assumed to be a
return of fund.
Post-retirement mortality:
Male annuity rates                                                                 PMA92 (B=1975)48
Female annuity rates                                                              PFA92  (B=1975)
Unisex annuity rates                                                              50%  of  PMA92 (B=1975)
                                                                                             + 50% of PFA92 (B=1975)49
Profit loading on annuities                                                     5%
The economic assumptions used are in line with Personal Investment Authority (PIA)
guidelines for future projections.
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G.3 Stochastic projections
Increase in RPI 2.5% pa
Pre-retirement investment returns in excess of RPI:
Mean  4.5% pa
Standard deviation50 15.94% pa
(up to last 5 years)
Standard deviation 12.3% pa
(last 5 years)
The mean return is consistent with the real return on investments assumed in the
deterministic projections. The standard deviation prior to the last 5 years is consistent
with the historical standard deviation of the annual real returns on a portfolio allocated
60% to equities and 40% to gilts51.  The standard deviation during the last 5 years is
consistent with the historical standard deviation of the annual real returns on a portfolio
allocated 100% to gilts. The standard deviations used have been chosen to represent a
‘lifestyling’ approach to investment policy, whereby the investments are moved
systematically into lower volatility fixed-interest securities in the five years approaching
retirement52.
Yield for purchasing annuity at retirement in excess of RPI:
Mean   3.5% pa
Standard deviation   0.63% pa
The mean yield is consistent with the returns assumed in the deterministic projections.
The standard deviation is consistent with the historical standard deviation of the real
redemption yield of a portfolio of long dated index linked gilts53.
Earnings growth in excess of RPI 1.5% pa
Promotional increases Nil
Career breaks Nil
Pre-retirement expenses 1% pa of the fund
Pre-retirement mortality No assumption needed as
benefit is assumed to be a
return of fund.
Post-retirement mortality:
Male annuity rates                                                                 PMA92 (B=1975)
Female annuity rates                                                              PFA92  (B=1975)
Unisex annuity rates                                                              50%  of  PMA92 (B=1975)
                                                                                             + 50%  of  PFA92 (B=1975)
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Profit loading on annuities                                                    5%
The stochastically varying returns have been assumed to be drawn independently  from
normal distributions with the appropriate means and standard deviations (less fund
management charges of 1% during the pre-retirement period).  The analysis in Section 6
is based on 5000 Monte Carlo simulations.
Appendix H – Assumptions used in the Stochastic Modelling of Alternative Vehicles
for Providing Income in Retirement
The main assumptions used in Section 8 are consistent with those used in Section 6.
Increase in RPI            2.5% pa
Investment returns in excess of RPI:
Mean 4.5%
Standard Deviation 15.94%
Yield for purchasing annuity at retirement in excess of RPI 3.5% pa54
Yield for purchasing deferred annuity in excess of RPI 3.5% pa55
Expenses for funds invested substantially in equities             1% pa of the fund
Post Retirement Mortality Unisex rates                                 50% of PMA92 (B=1975)
                                                                                             + 50% of PFA92 (B=1975)
Profit loading on annuities                                                     5%
Profit loading on deferred annuities                                       5%
The stochastically varying returns have been assumed to be drawn independently  from
normal distributions with the appropriate means and standard deviations (less fund
management charges of 1%).
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Endnotes
                                                          
1 So called because what is defined is the contribution rate into the plan; the pension benefit depends
exclusively on the value of the fund accumulated at the age of retirement.
2 This is specified in the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988; the Act requires that an annuity must be
purchased by age 75 at the latest.
3 With such schemes no fund is accumulated, instead the contributions of active members of the plan are
used to pay the pensions of retired members.
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4 So called because what is defined is the pension benefit from the plan, e.g., a pension of two-thirds of final
salary.
5 Ando and Modigliani (1963).
6 While individuals tend to smooth out their consumption expenditure over time, this does not necessarily
imply that it is constant over time.  A typical pattern in retirement, for example, is that consumption
expenditure is relatively high just after retirement, subsequently falls, but then rises again as individuals
make use of long term care in their final years.
7 E.g., Yaari (1965) and Fischer (1973).
8 Perfect capital markets imply that all risks can be perfectly hedged using the existing set of financial
assets.
9 See, e.g., Mirer (1994) and Poterba and Wise (1996).
10 See, e.g., Hurd (1989) and Bernheim (1991).
11 See, e.g., Yagi and Nishigaki (1993).
12 See,. e.g., Warshawsky (1988) and Friedman and Warshawsky (1990).
13Over 30% according to some studies, e.g., Poterba and Wise (1996) and Mitchell et al. (forthcoming).
14 By accumulated pension assets we mean the present discounted value of the promised future pension
payments under these plans.
15 See, e.g., Cherin and Hutchins (1978) and Milevsky (1998).
16 The Inland Revenue uses two legal cases to define annuities: Foley v Fletcher (1858): ‘an income is
purchased – the capital is gone – the principal having been converted into an annuity’; Perrin v Dickson
(1929): ‘an annuity means you spend your capital in buying an income’.
17 DTI Returns for 1997.
18 MacDonald (1996).
19 Finkelstein and Poterba (1999).
20 Credit Suisse First Boston (1999).
21 Adrian Waddingham of consulting actuaries Barnett Waddingham argues that: ‘We don’t think drawdown
is suitable for clients with less than £300,000 in their retirement pot.  Although you wouldn’t recommend it
to the man in the street, it might be viable for a person with £300,000 who has other investments’ (quoted in
Pensions Management, December 1999, p. 29)
22 However, this does depend on there being an adequate supply of both fixed-income and index-linked
bonds to back up the relevant annuity payments.  If there is a relative shortage of one type of bond, annuity
providers will only be able to acquire it by bidding up its price, so a smaller annuity will result and the
equivalence of values will no longer hold.
23 The government itself is considering the introduction of a ‘flexible decade of retirement’ between 60 and
70 as reported by Prescott (1999).
24 A step-down annuity is therefore equivalent to the combination of a life annuity that pays the RIR for life
and a temporary annuity that pays the difference between the MRI and the RIR between the Start Age and
State Pension Age.
25 For evidence of this refer to Table 10 of Willets (1999) which indicates that in the1990s male mortality
has improved faster than female mortality for all age groups over age 30.
26 Derived as follows: 20% of the difference between national average earnings (£400 per week) and the
LEL (£67 per week) is about £70. Adding the BSP to this and rounding to the nearest £10 gives £140.
27 Derived as follows: two-thirds of final pensionable earnings (about 80% of £400 per week) adjusted for
6-7 job changes in a lifetime (scaling factor of 0.7 (see Blake and Orszag (1997)) implies a pension at
retirement of around £150 per week (i.e., 0.7 x 0.66 x 0.8 x £400).  Adding the BSP to this and rounding to
the nearest £10 gives £220.
28 This was suggested to us by Tom Boardman.
29 It is important for the sake of an exact comparison that the same income is withdrawn as with an annuity,
even though the income drawdown rules allow some flexibility over how much is withdrawn.
30 The standards for charges-access-terms that have been applied to Independent Savings Accounts (ISAs)
and Stakeholder Pension Plans.
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31 This symmetry in the declared bonus rate matches the symmetry of the underlying returns distribution and
so in the long run will be self financing and thereby avoid the need for the insurance company to draw on
reserves.
32 This remark must, however, be tempered by two real world practicalities. First, immunisation strategies
are expensive and the costs have to be included in the annuity price. Second, there may be an insufficient
supply of financial instruments to undertake immunisation strategies. Immunisation is explained in detail in
Blake (2000, section 14.3.2).
33 See also Mantel (1999) who examines the consequences of the increasing funding of pension provision in
Europe.
34 The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries is currently undertaking a review of MFR arrangements; it is
expected that they will recommend that the yield on corporate bonds can be used in place of the yield on
gilts in MFR calculations.
35 Under the Maastricht Treaty, the PSBR cannot exceed 3% of GDP, while the National Debt cannot
exceed 60% of GDP.
36 SERPS is being replaced by an ultimately flat-rate State Second Pension beginning in April 2002
following the introduction of the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999.
37 This section draws on Blake (1999).
38 Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America – College Retirement Equity Fund.
39 March (1996).
40 Protected Rights is the name given to the component of a personal pension plan that has been used to
contract out of the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme and into which the National Insurance rebates
are invested.
41 This section draws on Mitchell et al (forthcoming), Poterba J. M. (1997), Prudential (1999), Quicken
(1999), Senate Committee (1999), Social Security (1999).
42  This section draws on Congressional Budget Office (1999), Commonwealth Department of Family and
Community Services  (1999), Hindle (1999) and OECD (1999).
43 This section draws on Canada Life (1999), Pensions Board (1998) and Revenue Commissioners (1999).
44 This section draws on Congressional Budget Office (1999).
45 This section draws on Asher (1999), Central Provident Fund (1999) and William Mercer (1999).
46 This section draws on a contribution from Tim Reay.
47 National Mutual Life (1996).
48 PMA92 and PFA92 are standard tables of mortality which have been compiled by the Continuous
Mortality Investigation Bureau of the Institute of Actuaries and the Faculty of Actuaries.  The tables refer to
males and females respectively.  The tables were derived from the mortality experience of life office
pensioners in the period 1991 to 1994.  The tables have been adjusted to allow for expected future
improvements in mortality.  The notation (B=1975) denotes that the version of the tables used is applicable
to individuals born in 1975.
49 This weighting anticipates the eventual convergence of male and female participation in the workforce.
50 The standard deviation measures the dispersion of investment returns about the mean return. In a given
year, there is approximately a 1-in-6 chance that the actual investment return will be larger than one
standard deviation above the mean return, and approximately a 1-in-6 chance that the actual investment
return will be smaller than one standard deviation below the mean return.
51 Credit Suisse First Boston (1999).
52 While lifestyling would normally lead to a reduction in the expected return on the investments as well as
in their risk, we have chosen to maintain a constant expected return as required by PIA guidelines.
53 DataSTREAM.
54 Assumed to be deterministic.
55 Assumed to be deterministic.
